



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SOCIAL ACTION

America's Foreign Policies Past and Present

by THOMAS A. BAILEY





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(*Professor of Historical Theology, Yale University Divinity School*)

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Thomas A. Bailey
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OUR GROWING POPULATION

1790

3,930,000

1810

7,240,000

1830

12,900,000

1850

23,200,000

1870

38,600,000

1890

62,900,000

1910

92,000,000

1930

122,800,000

1940

131,700,000

EACH FIGURE REPRESENTS 5,000,000 PERSONS

Historical Signposts Point the Way

Americans who want to take their full share in either the war or the coming peace need more knowledge of American history than most of us have. The provision of special courses for the new Army and Navy personnel makes this point plain for men in the armed forces. The small tempest stirred up by *The New York Times'* recent survey intended to test the competence of college freshmen in American history has helped to underline the same need among civilians. No one is compelled to take the weird results of this latter test more seriously than some of the freshmen seem to have taken the test itself. None the less, many a solid citizen who read through the questions must have squirmed, if he was honest with himself, at the gaping holes in his own knowledge of his country's past growth and present resources.

In no area is this ignorance likely to be more evident than in the history of American foreign policy. Moreover, there is no area in which a fair understanding of the past and its bearing on the present can be more valuable as a guide for the public opinion that must help to shape the role of the United States in the post-war world. Ignorance and disillusionment did much after 1918 to cheat us, and our associates and defeated opponents, of the chance for a more lasting peace. This time we want some usable knowledge of what is going on, and why, before it is too late to stave off another disastrous breakdown of international relations.

America's Foreign Policies is meant to help provide such knowledge. Professor Bailey has written a brilliantly compressed survey of the development of the United States' foreign policies from our early years of weakness, through the middle years

of expansion and consolidation at home, and our emergence since 1898 as a gigantic world power. The great merits of the article, for laymen who want a swift introduction to the difficult field of American diplomatic history, are its clarity and force, its pungency of style, its realism about some of the ruder forces that shape foreign policies, and its definiteness of focus on the present situation and of commitment to very specific conclusions about what the record means.

Every page deals with controversial issues, on which no simple brief statement can tell the full story. These issues grow more complex and explosive as we pass the council of Versailles and face the worldwide turmoil that has filled the past twenty-four years. Professor Bailey's judgments are not less emphatic and his style not less pointed in the discussion of these recent, troubled years than in the account of earlier, simpler times for which, perhaps, a settled perspective is somewhat easier to define. This simplicity and vividness involve some risk of suggesting that the issues are less tangled than conflicting interests of the Great Powers, governments in exile, parliamentary and congressional blocs, cartels, and other business, labor, and farm organizations actually make them. At the same time, this very simplicity and vividness make the present survey an excellent stimulus to hard thinking and further study. We commend it to our fellow ministers and laymen as a basis for vigorous discussion.

R. L. CALHOUN

1. The Morning of America



The American nation was not legally born until 1776, one hundred and sixty-nine years after the first dribble of English colonists had set foot on the swampy banks of the James River in Virginia. The prenatal period was actually longer than our existence as a nation, for not until 1945 will the United States be as old as Virginia was in 1776.

This troubled century and a half impressed many bitter lessons upon the struggling colonials. They had forsaken Europe to get away from economic hardships, religious persecutions, and social and political oppressions. The voyage across the ocean was normally a two- or three-month nightmare, with suffocating quarters, foul water, wormy food, disease, and death. When those who were still living staggered ashore, they had no desire to go back. They realized how far away Europe really was; they burned with a desire to hew new homes out of the wilderness.

But despite the width of the ocean and the determination of the colonists, they could not cut themselves off completely from Europe. England soon found herself engaged in a life-and-death struggle for control of North America with her French rivals on the north and her Spanish rivals on the south. When conflict broke out in Europe, the war whoop of French- or Spanish-led Indians would split the night air along the northern and southern frontiers. The American colonials, generally speaking, were not the peaceful farmers they wished to become; they were but soldiers on the firing line of England's empire.

From 1689 to 1763 there were four great European wars.

And the American colonies were actively involved in every one of them.

A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE

In 1775 the liberty-loving colonists raised the standard of revolt against the mother country. The odds against them were overwhelming; only the prospect of securing outside aid gave any real promise of success.

France was the logical ally. Humbled to the dust by England in the recent Seven Years' War, she was thirsting for revenge and for the restoration of her prestige and power. What could be sweeter than to ruin England by helping to liberate the richest and most desirable part of her colonial empire?

The stage was thus set for a military alliance between weak America and powerful France. Under ordinary circumstances we would have welcomed such aid with outflung arms. But we could not readily forget that we had fought four bloody wars against the French and their red allies in Canada. New England mothers still hushed their crying babes at night by whispering that the French were coming. Nor could we forget that we had left Europe in part because we wanted to escape the unhappy results of European entanglements. The growing isolationist tradition rebelled against a hard and fast alliance with a powerful yoke-fellow, because no one could tell how France might want to use us before releasing us from the yoke.

Alliance and entanglement seemed dangerous; but defeat and subjugation seemed worse. So in 1778 Congress reluctantly instructed our negotiators in Paris to conclude what proved to be our first, last, and only entangling alliance. Both nations solemnly agreed not to make a separate peace with England; both agreed to fight until the independence of the United States was officially recognized.

The legend has grown up that France helped us primarily

because she loved us. This is not true. Nations do not ordinarily do things for other nations because they love them. Although there was considerable sympathy for America in France, the alliance was essentially a marriage of convenience, conceived in self-interest. America wanted independence; France wanted revenge and a restoration of power. Each got what it wanted.

EUROPE'S DISTRESSES FIGHT AMERICA'S BATTLES

To say that America "licked" England during the Revolution is merely to say that "Daddy and I killed the bear." Spain and the Netherlands followed France into the war, which now widened into a titanic conflict. For the first time in nearly a century, superior enemy fleets threatened the shores of England. Britain was now fighting for her very existence, while the American war faded into a side issue.

Following reverses at Yorktown and elsewhere, the British sought to weaken the hostile combination against them by seducing us from the French Alliance. They offered such attractive terms, especially as to boundaries, that we wisely accepted them and, with French consent, wrote them into the Peace Treaty of 1783.

While we were still colonials, Europe's distresses were our distresses, for war in Europe meant war in America. Beginning in 1778, we won a series of dazzling diplomatic victories by taking full advantage of Europe's distresses. Because of them, France gave us unstinted aid; because of them, England granted us independence and the heart of the North American continent; and because of them, American statesmanship was to consolidate and expand the gains so dearly won.

2. The Fruits of Neutrality



The new American nation was a weak and sickly infant, whom few outsiders expected to live. Its people were war-torn, bankrupt, and disunited, scattered thinly east of the Alleghenies, and numbering only 3,000,000 souls.

The newly born republic had hardly a friend in the world.

Every monarch in Europe hoped that this ambitious new experiment in democracy—by far the largest ever undertaken—would collapse. A successful republic would put dangerous ideas into the heads of uneasy subjects. And a strong republic would interfere with European plans for expansion in the Americas.

PRECARIOUS BEGINNINGS

The British, smarting from their recent defeat, made no attempt to conceal their unfriendliness. They refused to make a trade treaty with us. They declined to evacuate a chain of some seven valuable fur trading posts inside our northern boundary, charging that we had not faithfully carried out the terms of the peace treaty. And from these very posts British officials gave open aid and comfort to the hostile Indians.

The Spaniards, entrenched on our southern and western flanks, also hated us, for they feared that the democratic virus might produce revolution in their far-flung American empire. Like the British, they retained posts on American soil; like the British, they exercised a malign influence over nearby Indian tribes. By occupying American forts, and tampering with the Indians, the

British and Spaniards together exercised control over approximately one-half of the territory that rightfully belonged under the American flag.

Our powerful ally, France, was scarcely more friendly. She schemed to keep us weak and divided, because a weak and divided America would be more likely to remain in French leading strings and do her bidding.

But the contempt of foreign powers proved to be a blessing in disguise. It opened the eyes of our people to the weakness of our government under the inadequate Articles of Confederation, and helped force the establishment of a strong central government under our present Constitution.

DIVIDED LOYALTIES

The new Administration, with the prestige of George Washington at its head, got off to a splendid start. But storm clouds quickly blew up over the European horizon. Some six weeks after Washington's inauguration, the first rumblings of revolution rocked monarchical France. Most Americans rejoiced. This was seemingly a second edition of our own Revolution—a blow against monarchy and a gain for democracy.

But centuries of pent-up emotion could not be released without frightful consequences. The French Revolution took an ugly turn when the guillotine was set up, and noble heads began to roll monotonously into executioners' baskets. The wealthy conservatives in America shuddered; perhaps the rabble would get out of hand and do the same thing here. American liberals, like Jefferson, were not overjoyed; but they felt that a little bloodletting should not obscure the great gains for human liberty.

In 1793 France declared war on England. The noisy pro-French faction in the United States demanded that we repay our debt to France by entering the fray against the hereditary foe. The pro-British faction no less noisily demanded that if we fight

at all we do so on the side of England—an England which was upholding life, property, and decency.

THE STRATEGY OF DELAY

Fortunately, the imperturbable Washington was not swayed by the clamor of either faction. He was not pro-French, or pro-British, but pro-American. He realized that we were still but a babe in the family of nations, and that we needed peace in which to organize our government and unite our people. If we became involved in a ruinous war, the results might well be bankruptcy, anarchy, and subjugation.

On the other hand, the longer we waited the stronger we became. Our population was doubling about every twenty years, and if we could stay out of Europe's wars we should become strong enough in a few decades to stand up for our rights. The policy of neutrality—of playing for time—was the only possible policy for a weak and disunited America.

On April 22, 1793, Washington issued his memorable Neutrality Proclamation, announcing to the world that America would stay out of the conflict raging between Britain and France. The violent pro-French faction denounced the President in the bitterest of terms. By the Treaty of Alliance with France we were bound to defend the French West Indies "forever"; and many Americans felt that we should now honor this obligation. But France did not press us to enter the war because we were more useful to her as a prosperous "feeder" neutral than as a prostrate partner. Neutrality was the best policy for both the Americans and the French.

THE DAMNATION OF JOHN JAY

The policy of neutrality was gravely threatened by a mounting bitterness against England. The Union Jack still flapped maddeningly over our northern posts. British officials still sold the Indian firewater and firearms—the very arms that were used to

butcher our pioneers on the frontier. And now the British were seizing scores of American ships bound for French ports, and throwing their crews into loathsome dungeons. From thousands of throats came a cry that we fight to avenge American wrongs and uphold freedom of the seas.

Again the level-headed Washington took prudent steps to give America peace instead of war. He sent the brilliant and experienced John Jay to England for the purpose of negotiating a treaty that would end our grievances. But Britain was fighting to the death with France, and she would concede nothing that would weaken her prosecution of the war. She flatly refused to stop her seizures of ships and other infringements upon neutral rights. Her only real concession was an agreement to evacuate the posts which she had already agreed to evacuate eleven years before. Even this she probably would not have yielded if she had not feared that we might join the ranks of her enemies.

Jay's disappointing treaty evoked a prolonged cry of condemnation from the pro-French, anti-British faction. Washington also disliked the treaty, but the alternative to accepting it was war. And war, in these formative years, was to be avoided at all costs. So he swallowed his pride, threw his influence behind the pact, and by the narrowest of margins secured the Senate's approval. The pro-French partisans cursed Washington in unrestrained language; but he bowed his head in silence. This was not only one of the most difficult but also one of the wisest decisions of his troubled career. It postponed war with England for seventeen full years, until a time when we were better able to withstand the shock of arms.

A STATESMAN DEPARTS

In 1796 a weary and aging Washington published his immortal Farewell Address to the people whom he had served so long and faithfully. Remembering the *permanent* entanglement with

France, he urged his countrymen in the future to make only "*temporary* alliances for *extraordinary* emergencies." Remembering the passionate excesses of the pro-French and pro-British factions, he declared that "the nation which indulges toward another a habitual hatred or a habitual fondness is in some degree a slave." And remembering how French agents had schemed to persuade Congress and the people to serve the interests of France, he urged his countrymen to exclude "the insidious wiles of foreign influence" from their midst.

In short, Washington was giving specific advice to a weak and disunited nation in the year 1796—advice that had grown out of recent and bitter experience. He definitely stated that we might look forward to taking a more positive position as we became stronger. He did not advocate isolation in the sense that we were not to interest ourselves in Europe. On the contrary, we were to have as "little *political* connection as possible," and keep out of the "*ordinary* vicissitudes of her politics." Washington's brand of isolation was abstention from the political broils of Europe, and the exclusion of Europe from our own private affairs, so that we could enjoy the blessings of complete independence.

REAPING THE HARVEST

The lodestar policy of remaining neutral and taking full advantage of Europe's distresses paid rich dividends even before Washington left office. Rather than drive us into the arms of France, England conceded Jay's Treaty. Though unsatisfactory, it gave us peace, the posts, and control of our own northwestern territory. Rather than drive us into the arms of England, Spain hastened to offset Jay's Treaty by negotiating Pinckney's Treaty (1795). In it, she yielded all of the major points in dispute, including free navigation of our Mississippi River outlet and control of our own territory in the Southwest.

By remaining neutral and allowing Europe's distresses to fight our battles for us, we purged our soil of foreign flags, and established our new government on solid foundations. Above all, we gained that greatest of all boons, time—the time that was needed by the new babe in the family of nations to reach adolescence.

3. The Beginnings of Expansion



The French, our good friends of yesteryear, were deeply angered by the treaty which Jay had negotiated with their arch-enemy, England. They seized hundreds of our merchant ships; mistreated our seamen; and insulted our diplomatic representatives by a crude attempt at bribery.

All America rang with the cry, "Millions for defense but not one cent for tribute!" The nation buzzed with warlike preparations; Washington was called from retirement to head the army; and the tiny Navy was put in readiness. From 1798 to 1800 our ships captured some eighty French vessels in West Indian waters, mostly privately owned craft.

This strange, undeclared conflict might have widened into a full-dress war had it not been for the statesmanlike hand of doughty President John Adams. He perceived as clearly as Washington that America, while weak, must play a waiting game, and bear insult with humility until strong enough to defend her honor with some prospect of success. But the leaders of the party which had elected Adams President were on fire for war, and woe to him who should frustrate them.

A smaller man might have put party and popularity above country. But not the flinty Adams. When he learned that France would receive new American envoys with respect, he took prompt measures to send them. His followers, cheated out of their war, condemned him in venomous terms. But they were wrong; he was right. America was still too weak to risk embroilment in a major war.

CANCELLING OFF ACCOUNTS

When the American envoys reached France, they found the situation favorable. Napoleon Bonaparte, now in power, did not want to fight America. He had his hands full with the European conflict; and he wanted to take over all Louisiana from Spain.

The American envoys sought \$20,000,000 in damages for the ships recently seized; they also sought an end of the French Alliance. Napoleon was willing to give up the Alliance if we would give up our demands for money. The compromise was finally arranged by the Convention of 1800, and our government reimbursed its own citizens for their losses. This, in effect, was the price we had to pay for getting rid of our first and only military alliance. It was a bargain at that.

The epochal Convention of 1800 did vastly more than end the Alliance and insure peace. Without it, we probably would have courted disaster by drifting into a full-fledged war with France. And if this had happened, Napoleon would not have sold us the vast territory of Louisiana at any price.

Adams was not re-elected to the Presidency. But he had the satisfaction of knowing that he had kept the ship of state on the course charted by Washington. No better epitaph could be written than the one he suggested: "Here lies John Adams, who took upon himself the responsibility of the peace with France in the year 1800."

BUYING AN EMPIRE TO GET A CITY

In 1801 the staggering news reached America that Napoleon had acquired Louisiana from Spain.

As long as the decaying Castilian crown held Louisiana we had not been especially worried. We were confident that our hardy frontiersmen could take it whenever we needed it.

But France was a different matter. If Napoleon, the greatest military genius of the age, should move in, the future would be dark, bloody, and uncertain. America simply could not permit a great and unfriendly Power to occupy the mouth of her all-important Mississippi outlet.

President Jefferson was as deeply attached to the policy of peace and nonentanglement as Washington and Adams. Yet so ominous was the prospect that he seriously considered making an entangling alliance with our old foe, England, to forestall our old friend, France.

But first Jefferson decided to try negotiation. He instructed our two envoys to offer \$10,000,000 for New Orleans and as much east of the Mississippi as was obtainable. If they failed in their mission, they were to seek an alliance with England.

Napoleon ended our perplexities when he abruptly offered to dump the entire Louisiana area into our laps for a paltry \$15,000,000. His war with England, which had halted only temporarily, was about to reopen, and he realized that he could not hold his new overseas empire against the powerful British navy. Again France's distresses were America's opportunity.

Our envoys were not authorized to buy all of Louisiana, nor to spend more than \$10,000,000, but they had the good sense to exceed their instructions. President Jefferson and the Senate accepted their agreement, and Louisiana was saved for us.

The results of this transaction—the greatest real estate bargain in history—were so widespread as to dazzle the imagination. At a stroke of the pen we doubled our original birthright, strength-

ened the Union by putting the mouth of the Mississippi under our own flag, and set the stage for expansion into Texas, Oregon, and California.

More than this, the purchase made possible the continuation of the sagacious policy of Washington and Adams. In French hands, Louisiana meant war with Napoleon and alliance with Britain; in our hands, it meant peace, prosperity, neutrality, and expansion.

4. The Struggle for Free Seas



The war which Napoleon wantonly reopened in 1803 roared to a furious climax. Britain was supreme on the sea; Napoleon was supreme on the land. Neither could come to grips with the other. It was the old struggle between the tiger and the shark.

These were golden days for American farmers and shippers.

The warring nations needed our grain, and were willing to pay high prices for it. All we asked for was freedom of the seas—the right to trade freely with both sides, without unlawful restrictions from either.

THE LAW OF CLAW AND FANG

When nations, like individuals, are fighting for their lives, they care little for the rights of innocent bystanders, especially if those bystanders are weak. England tried to strangle Napoleon by forcing all American ships to stop at British ports; Napoleon tried to starve England by seizing all American ships that did. The

United States was ground between the upper and the nether millstones.

More maddening was the British practice of stopping our ships on the high seas, and impressing alleged English seamen into His Majesty's Navy. By mistake or design, hundreds of American sailors were thus arbitrarily condemned to slavery in Britain's "floating hells," where many of them died or were killed in action. England, on her part, had a serious grievance against us, because we openly encouraged her seamen to desert and enter our flourishing merchant marine.

The political party of Washington and Adams had urged the building of a Navy strong enough to enforce respect for our rights. But President Jefferson hated war, and he had allowed the Navy to fall into an alarming state of decay. When the pinch came, we were too weak to fight for our rights; we were too proud to submit tamely to insolent violations of those rights.

Jefferson now came forward with a daring embargo proposal. The hard-pressed belligerents needed our foodstuffs and other commodities. If we shut up our vessels in our own ports, would not those belligerents soon come around, hat in hand, promising to respect our rights if we would only ship our products? Congress fell in with Jefferson's wishes, and in 1807 enacted this desperate experiment into law.

WAGING ECONOMIC WARFARE

The caustic John Randolph was correct when he said that the embargo was like cutting off one's toes to cure one's corns.

A withering blight fell upon the nation's economic life. Forests of dead masts sprang up in once-busy harbors; grass grew on the wharves. The ship owners cried out in protest. Even though an occasional vessel was seized, they could still make money. Profitable activity, with dishonor, was preferable to unprofitable inactivity, with honor.

The law-abiding citizen went bankrupt; the smuggler bagged huge profits. With the very foundations of government shaking, Congress was forced to repeal the embargo after only one year, and substitute for it a non-intercourse law. Our ships were now free to sail, except to British or French ports. America was still committed to the economic bludgeon, though in a less drastic form.

Disastrous though the embargo proved to be, Jefferson's instincts were sound. He realized, like Washington and Adams before him, that America, while weak, must purchase peace and neutrality at almost any price. The embargo was a high price, but it probably would have prevented war if the American people had supported it wholeheartedly.

Even so, Jefferson's policy came within a hair's breadth of complete success. The embargo hurt us; but it also hurt England. The distressed British merchants brought such strong pressure on their government that the Foreign Secretary announced in Parliament, *two days before America declared war*, that the hated restrictions on our shipping would be suspended. If there had been a transatlantic cable, there might have been no armed conflict.

THE WEST FIGHTS FOR EASTERN RIGHTS

But by the year 1812 the patience of hot-blooded Americans was at an end. Led by the young and bellicose War Hawks from the western waters, Congress plunged the disunited country into a conflict for which it was wretchedly prepared.

Curiously enough, New England and the other shipping centers did not want to fight for their rights. They distrusted the Administration in Washington; and they could still make satisfactory profits. The Westerners in general were the ones who wanted to fight for American rights. They also wanted to take Canada from the British and wipe out the base of supplies from

which the restless redmen got their munitions. And Canada was rich, desirable, poorly defended; a place that could be taken with ridiculous ease. In short, it would pay to fight for our rights—at least, so it seemed.

The war was badly mismanaged. On land we won only one real victory of any consequence against the British, and that was at New Orleans, after the peace was signed. The invasion of Canada quickly went into reverse, and when the war ended the British were occupying considerable portions of our territory, despite our brilliant defensive successes on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain. In 1814 the redcoats burned Washington, and sent the President and his officers scurrying into the nearby hills. Our gallant seamen won a dozen single-ship duels with the British, but when the war came to an end our tiny Navy was swept from the sea and our ports paralyzed by a vise-like blockade.

THE PEACE OF EXHAUSTION

When the War Hawks light-heartedly led the nation into war, they were counting on Napoleon's armies to keep the bulk of Britain's strength in Europe. Europe's distresses were our opportunity.

But in the spring of 1814 Napoleon collapsed, and we were left to face the wrath of our mighty foe alone. The British might have imposed their will upon us, if they had been willing to make the necessary effort. Yet they had been fighting France for nearly twenty years, and they were tax-burdened and war weary. British shippers were crying out for relief from the ravages of swift Yankee privateers. Europe was seething with unrest, and Napoleon, then on Elba, might come back—which he soon did.

So it was that Europe's distresses again came to our rescue. The peace-hungry British finally consented to make terms, under which they promised to restore all captured territory. But the

irony is that nothing whatever was said in the Treaty of Ghent about impressment, ship seizures, or the other rights for which we had so futilely fought. Both sides simply agreed to stop fighting.

5. The Birth of the Monroe Doctrine



The Peace of Ghent in 1815 heralded the dawn of a new era in American foreign affairs.

Throughout the twenty-three years prior to 1815 Europe had been almost continuously convulsed with the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon. The fortunes of America were tied to the tail of the European kite. We anxiously

scanned the Atlantic horizon for every packet boat, because news of the success or failure of the warring nations meant fear or rejoicing in the United States.

But in 1815 Napoleon met his Waterloo, and was safely marooned on the faraway isle of St. Helena. Europe relapsed into a period of exhaustion. For the first time since Washington's inauguration we were free to turn our backs on the Old World and busy ourselves with the titanic task of taming a continent.

GRABBING AT THE FLORIDAS

Yet the problem of Florida, which still belonged to Spain, remained to plague us, like a great, foreign growth attached to our continental domain.

Spain was weak and growing weaker; we were weak but grow-

ing stronger. In 1810 a group of hardy American frontiersmen in the Baton Rouge area of West Florida rose in revolt against the Spanish flag, established an independent republic, and were annexed to the United States.

In 1813, we bit another sizeable chunk from West Florida when we seized the Mobile area from the decrepit Spaniard, who this time was allied with England. Starting the War of 1812 with the cry, "On to Canada!" we ended with a small part of Florida.

Still the great bulk of East Florida escaped our clutch. Spain was too proud to sell it; she was too weak to police it. Murderous bands of her Indians sallied across the international line, plundering and killing American settlers, and then fleeing back to their swampy sanctuary.

In 1818 the hot-tempered General Jackson pursued some marauding Indians into East Florida. Disregarding the international boundary, he shot and hanged Indians, executed two British subjects, seized two Spanish forts, and lowered the Spanish flag.

The honor of Spain was outraged. But even the slow-moving officials in Madrid could see that if they did not sell to the pushful Yankee while the selling was good, they would soon lose Florida and get nothing for it, except perhaps a bloody and humiliating war.

In 1819, negotiations moved into their final stages. Spain agreed to transfer Florida to us, if we would abandon our claims to Texas, and pay damage claims to our own citizens totaling \$5,000,000. The bargain was struck, and the land of the Everglades was ours.

THE MENACE OF MONARCHY

When Napoleon was finally overthrown, the nerve-shattered European monarchs banded together in a kind of protective

association popularly though erroneously called the Holy Alliance. Its main purpose was to crush democratic uprisings and make the world safe for autocracy.

There was work to do in Spanish America. Spain's colonies, taking advantage of the upheaval in the Old World, had cast off the royal yoke and erected republics, after the pattern of the United States. Nothing could be more pleasing to the European monarchs than to trample down these saplings of liberty and restore autocratic rule.

Such a prospect struck cold fear to the hearts of the American people. If the Powers came, they might stay. If they stayed, they might think it wise to finish off the United States, the mother lode of democracy.

Nor was this our sole concern. On the northwest coast of North America the lumbering Russian bear had already pushed as far south as California, where he had established temporary outposts. If he remained, we might one day have to fight him, because we too coveted this fair window on the Pacific.

AN ENTANGLEMENT TRAP

This was the anxious situation when, in August 1823, the British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, made a remarkable proposal to our minister in London. Would the United States join with England in a scheme to prevent the Holy Alliance from crushing the newly born Spanish-American republics?

Canning's proposition was as flattering as it was unexpected. Eight scant years after our late unhappy war, England, one of the great Powers, was condescending to ask us, a third-rate Power, to enter into a partnership.

Our minister passed the proposal on to President Monroe, who promptly sought the advice of the aged ex-Presidents, Jefferson and Madison. This promised to be a serious entanglement, but so powerful was the Holy Alliance, and so grave seemed the danger,

that both statesmen were willing to depart from our settled policy of nonentanglement.

Not so the hard-headed Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, son of ex-President John Adams. Why, he asked, were our traditional enemies suddenly becoming so friendly? To him the answer was obvious. Lurking in the Canning proposal was the proviso that neither the United States nor England would acquire any of Spanish America. Some day we might want Texas, California, or Cuba, and it would be folly to tie our hands.

Adams also suspected, what we now know, that the Holy Alliance had no real intention of intervening in Spanish America. He also perceived that the British navy would probably not, in any event, permit the Holy Alliance to come, for that would mean depriving English merchants of the recently opened markets of Spanish America.

So it seemed safe for the United States, sheltered behind the stout wooden walls of Britain's fleet, to blow a democratic blast of defiance at all the Powers. And while doing so we would maintain our traditional nonentanglement policy.

MONROE LECTURES THE POWERS

Adams' views prevailed, and President Monroe, in his annual message of 1823, presented to the world the doctrine that later bore his name.

It was very simple. With an eye on Russia's prowlings on the northwest coast, Monroe announced that the Americas were no longer open to colonization. With an eye on the Holy Alliance, he warned the Powers that they were not to crush the infant republics or extend their monarchical systems to the New World.

In short, there were two hemispheres, each with a different set of interests. Let autocratic Europe leave us alone, and we would leave her alone. The essence of Monroe's doctrine may be summarized in three words: "Europe: Hands Off!"

There was nothing basically new about the Monroe Doctrine, except for our willingness to defend Spanish-America while defending ourselves. It was merely a specific application of the policies repeatedly emphasized by earlier statesmen—isolation, non-entanglement, nonintervention, and no-transfer. If the Powers of the Holy Alliance came, we would have to fight them in self-defense. This would mean war and entanglement. If we were to pursue our chosen policy, the Holy Alliance would have to stay away. In short, the Monroe Doctrine was a long-range self-defense doctrine.

AMERICA FOR THE AMERICANS

The people of the United States generally applauded Monroe's firm defiance of the "effete" monarchs of Europe. No one seems to have remembered that we had no Army and no Navy, and that one of these "effete" monarchies had burned our capital only nine years before. But we did not need a Navy; the British presumably would keep the Holy Alliance at bay.

The people of England also applauded Monroe's forceful phrases. Why should they object if we were willing to help them keep open the profitable Spanish-American markets? But Canning did not applaud. He was clever enough to see that the non-colonization edict applied to Britain as well as to Russia.

Nor did the European monarchs applaud. They were deeply angered by what seemed to be the offensive bluster of this upstart young republic. The words, "America for the Americans," jarred harshly on ears attuned for three centuries to "America for the Europeans." The Powers would have liked to administer a sound chastisement—but there again was the British navy.

The Spanish-American peoples did not at the time pay much attention to the Monroe Doctrine. They realized that it was the British fleet and not the paper pronouncement of Monroe that stood between them and the Holy Alliance. They also realized

that the doctrine was essentially a selfish one. Monroe was not primarily concerned about saving Latin America; he was primarily concerned about saving the United States.

FACT AND FANCY


The Monroe Doctrine is not domestic law. Congress has consistently refused to enact it into legislation.

The Monroe Doctrine is not international law. The Powers, notably Germany, have consistently denied it official recognition.

The Monroe Doctrine was simply a statement of the foreign policy of President Monroe. Other Presidents could ignore it—and did. Other Presidents could modify it—and did. Other Presidents could extend it—and did.

Elasticity is, in fact, the most distinguishing quality of the Doctrine. By adding various corollaries, we have been able to make it mean almost anything we have wanted it to mean. It has consequently grown with our growth, and has changed to meet changing conditions.

6. The Upsurge of Manifest Destiny



The 1820's slowly gave way to the 1830's, and the 1830's to the 1840's. America, no longer a babe in the family of nations, had passed through adolescence to lusty young manhood. The waiting game which Washington had found so necessary no longer had to be played. By 1850 the 3,000,000 people of 1780 had become 23,000,000, or

almost as many as lived in the British Isles. The time had passed when we had to dwell in daily dread of Europe. On the contrary,

it was now Europe's turn to dread what we might do to her holdings in this hemisphere.

Restless America was doing big things—felling trees and Indians, building canals and railroads, peopling new states, pushing the frontier ever west. We were in an expanding mood—a people on the march.

Reflecting this spirit, a wave of Manifest Destiny swept over the nation during the 1840's and 1850's. To America's multiplying millions it seemed "manifest" that God Almighty had "destined" this great people to occupy both American continents from Patagonia to the Pole.

TURNING SHARP CORNERS

During these boisterous decades the European nations, notably England, resented our boastfulness and feared our aggressiveness. But they were not free to unite against us, because of troublesome domestic problems and ominous international rivalries.

Even so, we skated perilously close to the brink of war with Britain. In 1837, when minority groups revolted in Canada, our enthusiasm for abolishing monarchy led us to give unneutral aid to the rebels. Several serious border clashes resulted, one of them involving the spectacular burning of an American ship by the British.

No less serious was a smouldering boundary dispute over northern Maine. Lumberjacks on both sides engaged in fisticuffs, while their governments made hurried preparations for war.

At this critical juncture, the British selected the affable Lord Ashburton as their special envoy to Washington, and he finally succeeded in negotiating with Secretary Webster the notable Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, which disposed of most of the outstanding problems.

But one was left unsettled. For many years both nations had claimed the great country of Oregon, by virtue of discovery,

exploration, and occupation. Since 1818 both nations had occupied the area jointly. The problem simmered until the 1840's, when hundreds of American pioneers began to darken the Oregon trail. In the rousing presidential election of 1844, thousands of lusty throats bawled, "All of Oregon or None"; "Fifty-Four Forty or Fight!"

The British government did not want to fight the Yankees over this distant wilderness. Yet they did not want to be bullied out of their rights. War fever ran high on both sides of the Atlantic until the spring of 1846, when London offered to divide the territory along the line of the 49th parallel. This was a reasonable compromise, which we ourselves had four times proposed, and the Senate promptly accepted it.

THE ARAB AND HIS CAMEL

The American people had long desired the rich and thinly populated expanse of Texas, and had reluctantly yielded their claim to it in order to get Florida.

Yet the Mexican authorities, with singular short-sightedness, encouraged the mass migration of Americans into Texas, beginning with the 1820's. It was the old story of the Arab who permitted his camel to thrust its nose into the tent on a cold night. Friction between the aggressive Anglo-Saxon and his Latin overlords ripened into revolution in 1835. When the smoke cleared away from the battlefield of San Jacinto, the Texans, with the unneutral aid of their American cousins, had ejected the Mexican from his tent.

The weak Texan republic promptly sought protection under the strong wings of the American eagle. Ordinarily, we should have welcomed the addition of this princely province. But Texas meant more slave territory, and the anti-slavery men of the North cried out so vehemently that the Administration dared not take in the Lone Star Republic.

The jilted bride then sought the protection of Britain and France, both of whom were delighted with the prospect of setting up a rival republic to block the southward surge of the grasping Yankee. This was a situation fraught with extreme danger: the American people wanted no bloody balance-of-power politics transplanted to this continent. So in 1845 Congress passed a joint resolution of annexation, and the bride was brought to the altar.

A DRIFTING DERELICT

Mexico was acutely unhappy over the elopement of her fair daughter. Although we had waited nine long years between the beginning of the courtship and the consummation of the marriage, Mexico impotently promised to reconquer Texas, and threatened war if we should annex it.

But Mexico had other things we wanted. For several decades far-visioned Americans had been casting covetous eyes on the sunbathed valleys and harbors of California. In 1845 President Polk attempted to buy a part of California and the connecting territory for \$25,000,000. Proud Mexico refused even to receive his envoy.

Like Texas, California was rapidly becoming an international derelict. American settlers were drifting into the feebly held province; British warships were making suspicious movements. We could not allow California to fall into foreign hands; she was too essential for our peace, security, and future expansion.

We probably could have avoided war with Mexico if we had made a determined effort to do so. We wanted California; Mexico would not sell at any price. She refused to pay legitimate damage claims to American citizens; she severed relations when we annexed Texas. She was blusteringly confident that she could whip the money-grubbing Yankee—at least so her leaders boasted.

Mexico was not loath to fight; it was profitable for us to fight. So when President Polk sent American troops into a disputed area north of the Rio Grande, a clash resulted, and war came "as naturally as a thunderstorm in July."

WESTWARD TO THE PACIFIC

The overconfident Mexicans were soundly thrashed by the hated invader, and the treaty of peace (1848) gave us final title to Texas, California, and the intervening territory.

Within two short years the position of the United States had undergone a tremendous change. We had now rounded out our continental domain, except for the Gadsden Purchase territory in southern Arizona and New Mexico, which we bought from Mexico in 1853 as the best route for a railroad to the Pacific.

But Oregon and California, our magnificent Pacific frontage, were separated from the rest of the country by a vast ocean of desert and mountain. If they were to be properly defended, or kept from drifting away from the Union, the problem of communications would have to be solved. The mad gold rush of 1848-1849 brought the matter to a head.

The most practicable route to the West Coast was by water, either around South America, or broken by an overland journey at the Isthmus. If these vital arteries were to be satisfactorily safeguarded, we needed Cuba and a foothold in Central America.

ISTHMIAN INVOLVEMENTS

Cuba, the priceless Pearl of the Antilles, was almost shaken into the basket of Manifest Destiny in the 1850's. Spain would not sell it, though we tried to persuade her to do so; and she was too weak to defend it.

The shackled hands of our Southern slaves saved Cuba for Spain. So bitter had the controversy over slavery become that

the Washington government dared not take Cuba, with its potential slave states, lest the North disrupt the Union. While the Powers of Europe were convulsed in the Crimean War (1854-1856), and we had a splendid opportunity to seize Cuba, we were powerless to do so. Our own distresses were so acute, for once, that we could not take advantage of those in Europe.

England viewed our designs on Cuba and on the Isthmus with deep suspicion. Possessed of a great merchant fleet, she feared that the Yankees might monopolize an Isthmian canal. To head us off, she secured a foothold on the coast of Nicaragua, which was then regarded as the eastern terminus of the most practicable waterway.

We feared Britain's designs; she feared ours. A compromise was finally worked out in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. Both nations agreed to co-operate in facilitating the construction of a canal; both agreed never to fortify it or exercise exclusive control over it.

This treaty possibly prevented war, and probably prevented England from gaining a stranglehold on the Isthmus. Some day, of course, we might want to build and fortify the canal ourselves. We could then reopen the question—with greater prospect of success. Time was on our side, for the longer we waited the stronger we became.

7. The Crucible of Civil War



In 1861 the increasingly bitter dispute between North and South erupted into four long years of bloody civil war.

The shoe was now on the other foot. For three quarters of a century Europe's distresses had been our successes. Now it had come to pass that our distresses were giving Europe an opportunity to take unwonted liberties in the Americas.

For three quarters of a century one of our basic policies had been to contend for freedom of the seas against the overwhelming might of the European Powers.

Now it had come to pass that these very Powers were the neutral carriers, contending for freedom of the seas. We were the belligerent, attempting to restrict freedom of the seas so as to blockade and starve out the beleaguered South.

Unexpectedly enough, the British recognized and respected our blockade, though it was so thinly spread as to be of questionable legality. Did this mean that they had suddenly come to love their aggressive American cousins? Not at all. The blockade was the most potent offensive weapon that the British themselves possessed, and they did not want to blunt its edge by insisting upon impossibly high standards.

DIVIDE AND CONQUER

In general, the governments and ruling classes of Europe sympathized with the South. For three quarters of a century they had been wishfully predicting the collapse of this dangerous experiment in democracy. Instead of collapsing, it had survived,

expanded, taken territory that the European nations coveted, and threatened their own American holdings.

Now the blessings of democracy had turned to ashes; brother was slaying brother. Two nations existed where only one had existed before. Perhaps they would kill each other off. But if they survived and became strong, the European powers could play one off against the other, while safeguarding their colonies and working their own will in the Americas. The longer the war lasted, the less the Yankee was to be feared.

If either England or France, with their powerful navies, had intervened and broken the blockade, the South undoubtedly would have won its independence. Both governments seriously considered intervention, but they were hesitant about getting together. Many factors made for caution. Their ruling classes, it is true, favored the South; but the masses favored the North and the dignity of free labor. They had read Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, and sensed that a victory for the North would be a victory for the common man.

THE ARSENAL OF DISUNION

There were many anxious hours for the North.

In November 1861, a United States warship seized two prominent Confederate diplomats from a British mail steamer, the *Trent*, on the high seas. When the British rose up as one man in righteous wrath, our government was forced to release the prisoners. One war at a time was enough; and certainly we could not fight with good grace over an infraction of so deep-rooted an American policy as freedom of the seas.

The South, having few shipyards, ordered a number of commerce destroyers built in England, the most famous of which was the *Alabama*. These vessels were unarmed craft when launched, but they picked up their guns elsewhere, and virtually wiped out the prospering American merchant marine.

The United States complained bitterly against the building of these "innocent" vessels, which sailed out through the loopholes of British law. But at the time we merely lodged protests, in the hope of collecting damages after the conflict had ended. One war at a time was still enough.

NAPOLÉON'S PUPPET EMPIRE

Behind the smoke screen of the American battlefields, Napoleon III of France invaded Mexico and propped a puppet Emperor, the Archduke Maximilian, upon a newly tinsel throne.

This was the most flagrant and alarming violation of the Monroe Doctrine in all our history. A sister republic was overthrown; a monarchical system was imposed upon its ruins; and a powerful European nation seized a next-door base from which to jeopardize our safety and expand southward into Latin America.

American hotbloods were all for throwing the upstart Emperor into the sea, but Secretary of State Seward was still working on the principle of one conflict at a time. We merely lodged pointed protests, for the sake of the record, while the Civil War was still on.

When the struggle came to a triumphant end, the North had nearly a thousand ships and a million bayonets. Napoleon III realized that the game was up. The Mexicans were in revolt; the French were grumbling under burdensome taxes; the European balance of power was shaky. Europe's distresses were now belatedly coming to our rescue. Napoleon took French leave of his puppet Maximilian, whose brief career ended before a Mexican firing squad.

The Monroe Doctrine emerged from this episode with vastly enhanced prestige. Before this time it had gradually become first a party catchword and then a national slogan. From this time on foreign Powers recognized its existence, and paid it grudging respect.

UNEXPECTED FRIENDS

Misery and politics make strange bedfellows.

In 1863, Russia was on the brink of war with both England and France. The Czar, fearing that his third-rate navy would be bottled up, cast about for some neutral haven, from which each of his ships could sally forth and plunder British commerce.

The most strategically situated haven was the United States, which also distrusted England and France, and which appreciated the friendly attitude of Russia. So in the autumn of 1863 two Russian fleets dropped anchor in American waters, one at New York, the other at San Francisco.

At this time the Northerners were deeply depressed by a dreary succession of defeats; they resented the outspoken sympathy of England and France for the South; and they feared possible intervention.

The sudden arrival of the Russian fleets seemed like a dispensation of Providence. It could have but one meaning. The Russians loved us, and they had sent their ships because they wanted to fight on our side if England and France should intervene on behalf of the South. The grateful Americans went wild with joy, and wined and dined their self-invited saviors. In the enthusiasm of the moment they forgot Washington's warning that nations do not confer favors on other nations primarily because they have friendly feelings toward them. Not until fifty-two years later did a historian reveal that in 1863 *we* had been protecting the Russian fleets.

"SEWARD'S ICEBOX"

When the Civil War came to an end, the Czar wanted to get rid of Russian America (Alaska). It was not only proving to be an expensive liability, but it might also become a source of trouble with the Americans. Why not sell to them now while they were grateful and well-disposed?

The Russian minister threw out hints, and in 1867 Secretary Seward offered to buy Alaska for \$7,200,000. The American people were astounded. Not one in ten thousand had known that Alaska existed; even fewer wanted it. But we could not disappoint our great and good friend, the Czar, especially after making the offer ourselves. Besides, the natural resources of Alaska might some day more than repay the purchase price (which they did). So the Senate unenthusiastically approved the treaty; the House reluctantly voted the money; and the Czar happily got rid of his liability.

The acquisition of Alaska, with its long finger of islands projecting hundreds of miles toward the Far East, thrust us farther into the Pacific, and brought both strategic advantages and liabilities. Although on this continent, Alaska was our first non-contiguous possession, and as such posed problems of transportation and communication which to this day have been only partially solved.

8. The Paths of Imperialism



To an unprecedented degree foreign affairs took a back seat during the three decades following the Civil War. We were preoccupied with reconstructing the South; building railroads; killing buffaloes and Indians; and creating our enormous industrial plant.

We were much too busy at home to be primarily interested in either expansion or national defense. We took Alaska reluctantly; we flatly refused to annex the Danish West Indies and

Santo Domingo. And the Navy gradually became a collection of rotten and worm-eaten hulks.

BRITAIN PAYS THE PIPER

But we were not too busy to forget our unsleeping resentment against England for her conduct during the recent war. Tens of thousands of Americans, heavily reinforced by embittered Irish immigrants, were demanding that Britain pay for her sins by ceding to us all of Canada.

During the Civil War, many British liberals had regretted the defective neutrality laws under which the Confederate commerce destroyers were built. As time wore on, increasing numbers of Englishmen began to realize that they had done the Americans a grave wrong.

The London government also began to realize that it had made a serious blunder. The European situation was ominous; and if war should come, what was to prevent a land-locked enemy from building scores of *Alabamas* in American ports for raids upon Britain's commerce. Would it not be wise to erase this fatal precedent from the books while there was yet time?

Britain hastened to make amends in the Treaty of Washington (1871). She not only agreed to place the *Alabama* and other claims before an arbitral tribunal in Geneva, but she consented to certain rules that made an American victory almost certain. The Tribunal eventually assessed the British \$15,500,000, a sum which was promptly paid.

This was the most sweeping and spectacular arbitral settlement ever entered into by the United States. It was a triumph for arbitration and the peaceful settlement of disputes—a policy which this country has long supported.

SPIRITED DIPLOMACY

During the 1870's and 1880's our interest in an Isthmian Canal grew with our industrial and commercial growth.

By this time we wanted to dig the canal by ourselves, and we found that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 with Britain tied our hands. Our spirited Secretary Blaine made an effort to induce the British to give it up, but they politely declined. Yet time was still on our side, and we could afford to postpone the showdown to a more propitious day.

Much more successful was Blaine's sponsorship of the First International Conference of American States.

The Pan American ideal—or the drawing together of all the American republics into a closer cultural and commercial relationship—dated back much earlier, to our own Henry Clay, and to Simón Bolívar, hero of the Latin American wars of independence. But Blaine took it up; and, under his driving leadership, delegates from the Latin American republics gathered in Washington, in 1889. Although there was much wining, dining, and speechmaking, the specific results were disappointing. The only enduring achievement of importance was the creation of what came to be the Pan American Union, which, among other things, made arrangements for future gatherings.

Yet all things must have their beginnings. The eight succeeding Pan-American conferences have taken on increasing significance, and each of them has been a tribute to the vision and zeal of Secretary Blaine.

GLIMPSES OF EMPIRE

By 1890 the 3,000,000 people of 1783 numbered 63,000,000, a figure exceeded only by China and Russia among independent states. The babe in the family of nations had become a veritable young giant, bursting with power.

This power had to find an outlet somewhere. The railroads were built, the free land pre-empted, the buffaloes killed, the Indians put on reservations. Giant farms and giant factories were piling up mountainous surpluses.

We were beginning now to look outward, and perhaps faintly glimpse our destiny. The old Civil War Navy, which had fallen into a dangerous state of decay, would no longer do. In the 1880's we belatedly began to build a powerful steel fleet.

Our new concern with wider horizons was dramatically revealed in 1889, when we quarreled with Germany over the far-away and unimportant Samoan archipelago. There was serious talk of war until a terrific hurricane wrecked both the American and German warships at Apia. When the islands were divided in 1899, we saw to it that we got our share.

In 1893, the dominant American element in Hawaii deposed the despotic queen, and asked for annexation. President Cleveland, an ardent anti-expansionist, felt that the queen had been wronged, and withdrew the treaty from the Senate. But in 1898, when Cleveland was gone and we thought we needed Hawaii as a supply base during the war with Spain, we gathered these partially Americanized islands in. They were a military asset of incalculable value, and henceforth served as the indispensable outer bastion of the Pacific Coast.

In 1895, President Cleveland, alleging that the Monroe Doctrine was involved, dramatically intervened in a boundary dispute between England and Venezuela, and insisted that we run the line where we thought it belonged.

American jingoes, reflecting a generation of anti-British feeling, cheered wildly; the British were perplexed and angered. The great majority had nothing but friendly feelings for America, and did not want to fight. The minority who wanted to chastise the Yankee were sobered by the international situation. The German Kaiser was rattling his saber, and the South African Boers were about to break into revolt. London was finally glad to accept our good offices, and the dispute with Venezuela was settled by arbitration.

ABATING A NUISANCE

The real blow-up came over Cuba, which in 1895 rose in revolt against the Spanish yoke. The cruel repressive measures of "Butcher" Weyler, combined with the depredations of the insurgents, produced a cesspool of filth, disease, and death off our very doorstep.

The humanitarian impulses of the American people cried out in protest. The blaring yellow journals, led by Hearst, lashed this sentiment into fury by printing lurid atrocity stories, and by beating the tom-toms of intervention.

On the evening of February 15, 1898, the United States battleship *Maine*, then anchored in Havana harbor, blew up with a reverberating roar and an appalling loss of life. To this day no one knows how the explosion occurred; but when an American commission reported that the vessel had been sunk by a submarine mine, the American people had but one answer: "Remember the *Maine*, to hell with Spain!"

The down-at-the-heels Spaniard did not want war, but after a four-hundred-year stay he did not want to be hustled off his island with unseemly haste. President McKinley did not want war, the leaders of his party did not want war, the big business interests did not want war. But the country, inflamed by the yellow journals, did. Public pressure became so overwhelming that McKinley finally threw the issue into the lap of Congress, which voted to free Cuba and abate this intolerable nuisance.

THE SIREN SONG OF IMPERIALISM

Our efficient new Navy smashed the over-matched Spanish fleets, and beat Spain to her knees. The temptation to keep long-coveted Cuba was strong, but we had entered the war to free her—and we did, subject to the Platt Amendment. This gave us the right to intervene and restore order, lest foreign nations take

advantage of Cuba's weakness and secure a base dangerously close to our shores.

Ironically and fatefully, the first blow for Cuba's freedom was struck on the other side of the world, where Commodore Dewey utterly destroyed the Spanish fleet at Manila. When the war ended, the islands were on our hands. If we turned them loose, we would create grave international problems; if we kept them, we would create burdensome domestic problems.

The anti-expansionists in America vehemently argued that the annexation of a distant, alien, and thickly populated tropical archipelago would violate our time-hallowed policies of isolation, nonentanglement, and the Monroe Doctrine.

The expansionists cried that Duty and Destiny required the charting of a new course. Before their eyes danced visions of trade, missionary activity, and world leadership. Other great Powers were scrambling for colonial spoils, and why should not we? "Take up the White Man's Burden," urged Kipling, the major prophet of British imperialism.

The expansionists (imperialists) won the debate, and we kept the Philippines. For good measure, we also scooped in Guam and Puerto Rico. Truly the ship of state was being set on a course that would take it into strange seas.

9. The Far Eastern Tinderbox



The Spanish-American War heralded the emergence of a new world Power. The guns of Dewey and Sampson had spoken a language which the other nations could not ignore. But if we had new prestige, we also had vast and strange imperial problems.

Until this time, we had been a continental power, without long and vulnerable maritime lines of communication. We had been able to get along with a modest-sized Navy, for we had only to defend our coastlines and Alaska. Now we would have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars in building a Navy big enough to protect the Philippines—a “heel of Achilles” some seven thousand miles away.

Unless we were going to incur the crushing expense of building a Navy for each ocean, we would have to dig a costly isthmian canal, so that our one-ocean Navy could be shuttled back and forth.

Verily, the white man’s burden was going to be a heavy one.

FOREIGN DEVILS IN CHINA

It is true that we did not become a Far Eastern Power until we fell heir to the Philippines, but this does not mean that our flag was a stranger to the Far East.

In 1784, only one year after independence was won, the first American merchantman sailed to China, and returned with a cargo of queer-smelling goods. In the single year 1801 thirty-

four such ships reached Canton, trading furs for tea and other products.

The Chinese looked down upon the "foreign devil" as a "barbarian," and restricted his trade to the single port of Canton. But in 1842 the British humbled China's pride in the Opium War, and forced open five ports. The next year the Chinese announced their most-favored-nation policy; that is, privileges granted to one nation would be available to all.

In 1844 the United States negotiated the memorable Cushing treaty with China, under which we were formally granted most-favored-nation rights, as well as other privileges.

In the 1840's and 1850's American trade with China boomed, and our majestic clipper ships showed their rivals a "streak of foam" in carrying the new tea crop to Western markets. Other powers fought the Chinese, but we stayed on the sidelines and bloodlessly reaped the advantages they won by utilizing our most-favored-nation guarantee.

HAMMERING DOWN JAPAN'S DOORS

The Japanese, like the Chinese, hated and feared the grasping foreigner, and for over two centuries barricaded themselves within their island empire, permitting only the Dutch and Chinese to enjoy a severely limited trade at the single port of Nagasaki.

Upon acquiring Oregon and California, and a firm foothold on the Pacific, we became much more interested in trade and navigation in the Far East, and consequently decided to make a determined effort to open Japan.

In 1853-1854 Commodore Matthew C. Perry, with a small fleet of smoke-belching warships, sailed into Japanese waters, and by a display of both force and tact, succeeded in negotiating the first general treaty that Japan had ever made with a foreign Power.

Other treaties followed with America and with other nations; Japan threw off her feudal isolation; she adopted Western ways; and within a half century she had telescoped the thousand years between feudalism and modernism.

The semi-forceful opening of Japan by Perry was one of the great events of world history. If Japan had continued her medieval isolationism, she probably would have been gobbled up in time by Russia or some other power. As it was, she copied Western weapons, and lived to grow up and do some gobbling of her own.

THE FAR EASTERN GRAB BAG

When the United States was suddenly catapulted into the Far Eastern arena, the situation there was dangerously explosive.

The Chinese Empire, in its war with Japan of 1894-1895, had revealed a fatal weakness. The European nations, stimulated by the fiercely competitive land-grabbing of the era, descended upon the "living carcass" of China, and began to extort great leaseholds and spheres of influence.

Both American and British merchants viewed this process with growing alarm. If the greedy Powers erected high tariff walls within their leaseholds, what would become of our trade?

In 1899, Secretary John Hay addressed notes to the great Powers, urging them not to discriminate against other foreigners within their spheres of interest. This, in short, was the Open Door principle, or the right to compete on a basis of equality.

The more grasping of the Powers were placed in an extremely awkward position. It was like asking all persons in a room who were not thieves to stand up; the thieves would have to stand up. All the nations that held leaseholds returned qualified or evasive answers. Russia's reply was actually a refusal. Hay thereupon resorted to Yankee bluff: he announced that the assent of the powers was "final and definitive."

PROPPING THE DOOR OPEN

The next year, 1900, a group of fanatical Chinese, known as the Boxers, rose up against the "foreign devils," and besieged the diplomatic corps in Peking, including the Americans. An international rescue army of some 18,000 men was hastily raised, to which we contributed 2,500 troops, despite our strong isolationist traditions. This was striking evidence of our new responsibilities as a world Power.

When the international army finally rescued the beleaguered Legations in Peking, Secretary Hay feared that the Powers would undertake a wholesale dismemberment of China. He therefore announced that the United States stood for the territorial integrity of all China, and for the Open Door in "*all parts*" of the Empire, not just in the foreign leaseholds.

Hay did not call upon the Powers to accept this new definition of the Open Door. But they found it desirable to pay some heed to it, at least temporarily, partly because of the intervention of the United States, and partly because their rivalries were such that no one Power would permit another to make off with the lion's share of the loot.

THE YELLOW PERIL

For half a century we looked upon Japan as our protégé, and took great pride in the rapidity of the little fellow's development.

When, in 1904, Japan grappled with the Russian bear in Manchuria, our sympathies were all with the little fellow. But the little fellow administered a sound beating to the big fellow, and emerged as the dominant power in the Far East. We were not so sure as we once were that Perry had done a wise thing when he forced open the gates of Japan.

Following the Russo-Japanese War, hundreds of restless Nipponese began to leave their crowded islands for the fertile expanses of our Pacific Coast. California laborers feared for their

standard of living, and San Francisco showed its displeasure by excluding Japanese from the public schools attended by whites.

Public opinion in Japan flared up angrily at this act of discrimination, and the "historic friendship" was placed in grave jeopardy. But President Theodore Roosevelt intervened energetically in California, and finally arranged for the admittance of Japanese children to schools with the whites. In return, Tokyo promised, through the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908, not to issue any more passports to coolies intending to come to the mainland of the United States.


THE END OF A GOLDEN AGE

Roosevelt had tried to do the fair thing, but somehow he got the idea that the Japanese thought he had done so because he was afraid of them. To impress the Japanese with our naval power, he ordered the entire fleet of sixteen battleships on a spectacular 46,000 mile cruise around the world (1907-1909). The ships were invited to visit Japanese waters, where they were received with tremendous enthusiasm; and this exhibition of friendliness did much to ease the tension between the two nations.

The golden age in Japanese-American relations ended with the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. Within the short space of seven years, both nations had become world powers. The little fellow had grown up, and when his interests clashed with ours we could no longer pat him on the head. Suspicion, jealousy, and, to some extent, fear were engendered on both sides. It was the price that both nations seemingly had to pay for coming of age.

TERRITORIAL GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES





10. The Internationalism of the Big Stick



Shortly before the outbreak of war with Spain, the United States battleship *Oregon*, then on the Pacific Coast, was ordered to join the Atlantic fleet. The American public breathlessly followed her course as she churned all the way around South America, on a route that would have been cut several thousand miles by a Panama canal. Suppose that our fleet had been destroyed as a result of her failure to arrive in time? Such disquieting thoughts did more than anything else to crystallize sentiment for an Isthmian waterway.

PATTING THE EAGLE'S HEAD

But would the British release us from the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, under which we could not obtain exclusive control over a canal?

The prospects were good, because the British had suddenly become very friendly just before and during our war with Spain. What was the main reason that lay behind this unexpectedly pleasant purring of the lion?

Europe's distresses again were at work. Faced with the rising might of Germany, and without friends in the world, Britain was seeking the support of her American offspring. She needed all of her naval strength for European waters. Would it not be wise to give the Yankees a free hand in America, withdraw from the Caribbean, and let the United States Navy defend the Monroe Doctrine by keeping Germany away from American (and British) possessions?

This is precisely what happened. As an important preliminary step, the British granted us a new treaty in 1901, under which they conceded to us the exclusive right to build and fortify an isthmian canal.

A REPUBLIC IS BORN

President Theodore Roosevelt was eager to get the credit for beginning work on the canal. So in 1903 Secretary Hay negotiated a pact with Colombia, which then owned the Isthmus of Panama, granting us the privilege of constructing a waterway. But the Colombian Congress declined to approve the treaty.

Meanwhile a periodic revolution had been brewing in Panama. When it broke out, the United States, bound by its treaty of 1846 with Colombia to keep the transit route clear, prevented Colombian troops from landing. The one-day revolution succeeded, and on November 4, 1903, Panama proclaimed herself a republic. Two days later Washington recognized her as a member of the family of nations. Twelve days later we signed a treaty with her giving us the right to construct a canal.

Roosevelt and his many supporters defended his hurried action by saying that he had a "mandate from civilization" to build the canal, and that Colombia must not stand in the way. His critics replied that an equally practicable waterway could be constructed across Nicaragua, a country which was most anxious to make the necessary concessions.

In 1914 the Panama canal was finished, and the fleet could be conveniently moved from one ocean to another.

In 1921, after Roosevelt's death, we paid aggrieved Colombia \$25,000,000 as a partial salve to her feelings.

Whatever the justification for Roosevelt's hasty methods, it is clear that they grievously offended our sister republic, and complicated our Latin-American relations for some years to come.

DISPLAYING THE BIG STICK

The foreign policy of Theodore Roosevelt marked a sharp break with the isolationist traditions of the past. For the first time in history, the power of the United States was actively and positively used to direct world affairs.

Roosevelt believed in a policy of speaking softly but carrying a Big Stick. If he had a Big Stick, other nations would respect his position, and he would not have to shout. In keeping with this policy, he brought the battleship strength of the Navy to a point where it ranked second only to that of England.

Roosevelt used the Big Stick method, or claimed he used it, in connection with problems involving the Germans, the British, the Japanese, and the Russians. Sometimes he was trying to safeguard the Monroe Doctrine in this hemisphere; at other times he was trying to end war in the Far East or prevent war from breaking out in Europe. But, his critics charged, meddling in Morocco and interfering in the Far East were drastic departures from the nonentanglement policies of the Fathers.

His answer was that the United States was now a great Power and that if a world war came we should be drawn into it. As an elementary measure of self-protection, it was our business to help iron out the troubles of other continents.

OUT-MONROEING MONROE

By 1904 the Dominican Republic was bankrupt. Rumors were current that the European powers, particularly Germany, were coming over to collect their debts by force. If they came, they might stay; if they stayed, they would jeopardize our canal and violate our Monroe Doctrine. And this might mean war.

So, said the realistic Roosevelt, the prudent thing to do would be to intervene ourselves, collect the money, and keep the power on the other side of the Atlantic. Under this policy, we took

over management of the Dominican customs receipts, and satisfied the European creditors.

In short, the famous Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine meant intervening ourselves to prevent a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Under it, we were shortly to land marines in Nicaragua and Haiti, as well as the Dominican Republic, where we restored order, protected American lives and property, and safeguarded the approaches to the canal.

However necessary these moves may have seemed from the viewpoint of the United States, the Latin American republics regarded the Roosevelt Corollary as a distortion of the original Monroe Doctrine, and an assault upon their sovereign rights.

THE DOLLAR BECOMES A DIPLOMAT

By 1910, smokestacks were begriming our large cities, our foreign trade was flourishing, our banks were bulging. American bankers and exporters had to find new worlds to conquer.

Up to this time, the dollar had been timorous about venturing abroad: the profits at home were high, the risks in foreign lands were great, the competition of foreign investors was ruthless.

President Taft, Roosevelt's successor, planned to use the government's influence to open up opportunities for the dollar abroad, and to steer American investments into foreign enterprises. In this way American capital could be used to support our official policy, while at the same time bringing the blessings of civilization to backward peoples.

In China, the dollar could bolster the Open Door by keeping foreign investors from getting a complete monopoly of railroads and other economic resources. This policy did not work well, because the American bankers did not want to be prodded into Chinese investments, and because Washington aroused the suspicion of the other Powers, notably Japan.

In Latin America, the dollar could protect the Panama Canal lifeline. It would displace foreign investors, who might otherwise buy up potential bases near the canal, or who might exercise dangerous control over the governments of the bankrupt "banana republics."

Taft was especially concerned about Nicaragua, which was not only near the Panama Canal, but which contained a valuable alternate route. His Administration consequently pumped the dollar in, forced foreign investments out, and sent down an American collector of the customs. Our danger zone had to be protected at any cost.

DOLLAR DIPLOMACY BECOMES LIFE LINE DIPLOMACY

Before coming to the Presidency, in 1913, the idealistic Woodrow Wilson had repeatedly expressed bitter disapproval of the crass materialism of dollar diplomacy. But as time wore on he made the painful discovery that idealism would have to yield to grim necessity.

The Taft administration had drawn up a treaty with Nicaragua which gave us the right to dig a canal there, and build bases at both ends—all for only \$3,000,000. This was much too attractive a bargain to turn down. So the Wilson administration rewrote the treaty in stronger terms, and ratified it. One critic charged that this pact made the Dollar Diplomacy of Taft look like "ten-cent diplomacy."

In 1915, terrible disorders broke out in Haiti, too close to the Panama Canal life line for comfort. If we did not intervene, some foreign power might. So the marines landed, and at the cost of some 2,000 Haitian lives eventually restored order. The period of occupation lasted until 1934.

In 1916, similar disorders brought the marines to the Dominican Republic, and they stayed eight years. Under American protection, both Haiti and the Dominican Republic were blessed.

with new schools, roads, and sewers. But many of these people preferred dirt and disease to foreign control.

In 1917, we bought the tiny Virgin Islands from Denmark for \$25,000,000, or more than we had paid for all Louisiana. We were afraid that Germany might get them and menace our Panama life line. The high price was the measure of our fear.

What with purchases, protectorates, interventions, leaseholds, and economic exploitation, we had by this time virtually turned the Caribbean into an American lake.

11. The Phantom of Neutral Rights



In 1914, the smouldering European volcano erupted.

This was the eighth general European war we had witnessed since 1689, four during our colonial existence, four during our national existence. *And we had not been able to stay out of a single one of the previous seven.*

But this one was different. We wanted to stay out; we expected to stay out; and we congratulated our ancestors on having had the good sense to come to America.

Yet we were not neutral in spirit. Our sympathies were overwhelmingly with England, France, and their allies in the struggle against Germany. After all, we were of English blood, and we owed France an incalculable debt for her Revolutionary aid.

On the other hand, we distrusted German Junkerism, militarism, navalism, and imperialism, all of which seemed to be symbolized in the fierce-mustached and theatrical Kaiser. And

when the Germans tore up a solemn treaty as a "scrap of paper" and invaded Belgium to strike at France, millions of Americans felt that Germany was little better than an international mad dog.

Yet our traditional policy of keeping out of Europe's wars was stronger than our sympathy for the Allies. Besides, as in the pre-1812 days, it would prove profitable to invoke freedom of the seas and trade with both sides.

NEW WEAPONS—NEW RULES

Great Britain's sea power promptly cut off our market in Germany. We could have had no grounds for complaint if the British had done this by establishing the ordinary close-in blockade of the German coasts. But stationary ships were a perfect target for the newly perfected submarine; so the British modified the old rules by stationing their vessels on the shipping lanes, halting neutral vessels, and sending them to port for a leisurely examination.

American merchants flared up in anger, but they cooled off somewhat when the British paid for confiscated cargoes at good prices. Yet as far as trade with Germany was concerned, freedom of the seas was a dead letter.

Our government protested vigorously against British violations of the old rules, but aside from that we did nothing, and the British conceded nothing. We had a powerful Navy, and could have forced England to respect our rights, but we did not. We sympathized with the Allies, and we did not want to do anything that would disrupt the immensely profitable war trade that had sprung up with them.

THE PERISCOPE EMERGES

The Germans, who ultimately would be faced with the gaunt specter of starvation, did not submit to British blockade measures lying down. Early in 1915 they proclaimed a submarine counter-

blockade of the British Isles, and promised to destroy all *enemy* ships found within the danger zone. *Neutral* vessels might, of course, be sunk by mistake; hence they had better keep out.

Under the old rules of international law, a warship could sink a merchantman only after stopping it, examining it, and putting its passengers and crew in a place of genuine safety. But the submarine was a frail craft, easily sunk by ramming or by one well placed shell. The only way it could operate safely was to launch its lethal torpedo without emerging. This modification of the old rules in the light of new weapons was bitterly condemned by the British.

On May 7, 1915, a crack British passenger liner, the *Lusitania*, was torpedoed without warning off Ireland, with a loss of 1,198 men, women, and children, 128 of them Americans. Unknown to the German U-boat commander, the liner was carrying munitions, but under international law she could not be sunk without humanitarian precautions.

Both American and world opinion was outraged by this horrible act of inhumanity. President Wilson addressed a series of strong notes to Berlin, protesting most emphatically against such violations of international law. In his fateful *Sussex* ultimatum of April 1916, he promised to break relations if Germany did not cease sinking unresisting merchantmen without proper safeguards. This the Germans, with certain qualifications, reluctantly consented to do.

MIGHT MAKES RIGHT

Why did Wilson thus issue an ultimatum from which there was no honorable retreat?

Until this time no American ship had been sunk by a German submarine. Until the final crisis all but three of the 179 Americans who lost their lives on the high seas had been traveling on British or other belligerent ships.

Then why not require American citizens to stay home, or travel on American or other neutral vessels? Why fight Germany because our citizens, some of them pleasure bent, refused to keep off munitions-laden British ships?

A strong agitation started in Congress to bar Americans from belligerent vessels. But Wilson spiked the movement. American citizens had a perfect legal right to sail on belligerent merchantmen. If, Wilson argued, we yielded this right to Germany, then Germany would ask us to yield other rights, and before long the whole "fine fabric" of international law would break down.

Wilson was doubtless right. But he should not have taken such an uncompromising stand unless willing to build up sufficient military strength to force the Germans to respect his position. This he not only failed to do, but refused to do, until too late.

THE BREAK WITH BERLIN

Early in 1917 the Germans announced the opening of unrestricted submarine warfare. They had decided to stake everything on one throw of the dice. The British blockade was beginning to strangle them; and by sinking *all* ships, enemy or neutral, approaching the British Isles, they would starve England out and win the war.

Of course, American ships would be sunk, and America would be forced in. Our Navy was powerful, but the British already dominated the surface of the sea. Our army was pitifully weak, and before we could raise a powerful force and transport it overseas, the war would be won. Thus the Germans reasoned.

We could still have avoided war by keeping our ships out of the submarine zones. But Wilson had nailed his colors to the mast when he pledged a severance of relations should unlawful submarine warfare be reopened. On February 3, 1917, the German ambassador was handed his passports.

Wilson hated war; the country was reluctant to go to war.

Wilson continued to hope against hope that the U-boats would not sink any of our ships in the danger zones. But when the news came that several had been torpedoed, with heavy loss of life, he went before Congress and in a stirring message asked for an official recognition of the fact that Germany was *making war on us*—which she certainly was. On April 6, 1917, Congress passed the fateful resolution.

THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR

Many factors contributed to the state of mind which seemingly made war inevitable: sympathy with the Allies, which was strengthened by the gold chains of trade; German inhumanity, especially as exemplified by the occupation of Belgium and the sinking of the *Lusitania*; German spy and sabotage plots; and a growing fear that the Kaiser would challenge the Monroe Doctrine and attack us when he had won. It was better to fight while we could still have Allies.

But the submarine was clearly the precipitating cause of the war. Without it, we would not have entered when we did, perhaps never.

From 1803 to 1812, both England and France had flagrantly violated our rights on the high seas. Technically, we should have fought both, but we chose England because her offenses came closer home. They involved the lives of American citizens.

From 1914 to 1917, both England and Germany violated our rights on the high seas: the one through a long-range blockade, the other through a submarine blockade. But the cargoes that the British seized could be paid for; the lives that the Germans took could never be paid for.

Germany's offenses came nearer home. This fact, combined with our fear of her purposes, caused us to accept her challenge, once unrestricted submarine warfare began to take its toll of our ships and lives.

12. The Peace That Failed



American public opinion was somewhat confused and apathetic when we entered the war in 1917.

Woodrow Wilson provided the leadership that was so urgently needed. Holding aloft the torch of idealism, he united the nation in a holy crusade which developed overwhelming power.

We were fighting "to make the world safe for democracy"; we were fighting "a war to end wars."

Wilson's plans for a just and lasting peace were eloquently set forth in a number of remarkable statements, notably in the Fourteen Points address of January 8, 1918. Among his aims were freedom of the seas, lowered economic barriers, arms reduction, and (a later point) self-determination for submerged minorities.

The final and capstone point was the League of Nations, which would prevent wars by keeping the aggressors in check, and by making provision for peaceful change.

Wilson's inspiring utterances captivated the imagination of mankind and won for him the moral leadership of the world to an extent seldom if ever attained by mortal man. From Finland to the Far East millions worshipped him as the new Moses, and counted on him to lead them into the Promised Land of perpetual peace.

COMPROMISING AWAY THE POINTS

Late in 1918 the German armies began to crumble, and Berlin sued for a peace based on the Fourteen Points. With some modi-

fications this request was granted, and the German hosts laid down their arms.

Wilson decided to go to the Paris Peace Conference as the head of the American delegation, because he felt that only by being there in person, and by utilizing his enormous prestige, could he win acceptance of the Fourteen Points.

Wilson, though fighting valiantly and often brilliantly, was definitely worsted. He ran into a stone wall of fear, suspicion, greed, jealousy, cross-purposes, and secret treaties. He was finally compelled to compromise away most of the points in order to salvage the remainder.

But he did succeed in forcing the victors to insert the Covenant of the League of Nations into the Treaty of Versailles as Part I. Wilson was acutely unhappy over having to surrender so many of the Fourteen Points, but he salved his conscience with the thought that the League would eventually iron out the injustices of the treaty.

THE DEAD CLUTCH OF TRADITIONALISM

Wilson was now asking the American people to make the most momentous decision in their foreign policy since 1793. He was asking them to turn their backs sharply on a century of non-entanglement, to underwrite a European settlement, and to participate actively in the League of Nations.

At the outset, American public opinion seems to have strongly favored both the treaty and the assumption of new world responsibilities. The horrors of war were still fresh in mind; and if we could purchase permanent peace by sacrificing horse-and-buggy traditionalism, we should be the gainers.

But Wilson faced many formidable opponents in his attempt to remake our foreign policy.

The liberals were aroused because Wilson had been forced to barter away the Fourteen Points. The German-Americans,

the Italian-Americans, and the Irish-Americans were embittered because the "old country" had not fared better.

A great many Republicans, who were now the majority party, hated the Democratic Wilson and all his works. Before the war he had driven through domestic reforms which trod heavily on their toes; during the war he had exercised dictatorial powers; and in making the peace he had not only failed to defer to the Republican Senate but he had placed only one uninfluential Republican on a peace commission of five.

The traditionalists were up in arms. Why throw overboard the nonentanglement precepts of the Founding Fathers and become subjects of a superstate? Suppose the League should order American boys to Hejaz to protect King Hussein against the Bedouins? Suppose the League should challenge our sacred Monroe Doctrine by intervening in Latin America? There was a great deal of popular confusion about the actual powers and functions of the League.

WILSON SLAYS HIS BRAIN CHILD

The Republicans in the Senate, headed by Henry Cabot Lodge, did not expect to defeat the treaty. They merely hoped to "Republicanize" and "Americanize" it by adding certain reservations that would safeguard our historic policies.

In line with this strategy, Lodge delayed the treaty in the Senate Committee, while the isolationist press savagely misrepresented it. Public opinion, preoccupied with the high cost of living and other domestic problems, began to drift and grow confused.

The frail and nerve-wracked Wilson then made the fateful decision to appeal in person over the heads of the Senate to the people. During the war they had responded magnificently to his leadership; surely they would not fail him now.

Against the advice of physicians and friends, Wilson under-

took a barnstorming tour of the country that would have taxed the stamina of a strong man. The responses of his audiences were at first lukewarm, but as he reached the Pacific Coast he received tremendous ovations.

Flesh and blood could endure only so much. In Colorado Wilson collapsed, and his remaining speeches were canceled. Whisked back to Washington in a special train, he lay for months in the White House, a paralyzed and shattered old man.

The treaty was finally reported to the Senate, with Republican reservations. By this time it was clear that we were either to have a treaty with reservations, or no treaty at all.

But this was not clear to the sick and secluded Wilson, who sent word to his Democratic following in the Senate that they were to vote against a treaty with Republican reservations. Enough Democrats blindly did his bidding to bring about a final defeat of the treaty, although to the very end an overwhelming majority of the Senators actually favored the treaty with some reservations.

The supreme irony is that Wilson actually slew the League of Nations with his own hands.

RIGHTS WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITIES

But Wilson did not believe that the League was dead. He hoped that an aroused public opinion would force the Senate to approve the treaty without vital reservations. With this in mind, he called upon the people to return a resounding mandate for the League in the Presidential election of 1920.

The Republicans nominated the handsome and mediocre Senator Harding. He promised peace and quiet—"normalcy."

The Democrats nominated the less handsome but no less mediocre Governor Cox of Ohio. He promised the League, and the assumption of world responsibilities.

But by this time the American people were tired of "moral

overstrain" and of well-doing. They were war-weary, disillusioned, preoccupied with problems of reconstruction, and confused by the endless debate over the League. On election day they rose up and swept Harding into office by a tremendous majority of 7,000,000 votes.

Was this a mandate on the League?

Not at all. Cox favored the League of Nations; Harding favored an Association of Nations. Many pro-League Republicans voted for Harding as the surest way of getting into the League; many anti-League Republicans voted for him as the surest way of keeping out.

If the election meant anything, it meant that the American people were tired of Wilsonism and Democratic rule. They wanted a change—and they got it.

After Harding took office, Congress passed a joint resolution officially declaring the war at an end, and reserving the rights and privileges of a victorious power. Shortly thereafter, we concluded separate peace treaties with the defeated enemy.

Thus America made peace with Europe. We no longer claimed a share in world leadership; all we claimed was rights without responsibilities. We wanted world peace but we did not want to sacrifice anything to get it.

13. The New Isolationism



The enormous majority for Harding was interpreted by the politicians as a mandate against the League of Nations. Henceforth it seemed politically wise to till our garden alone, together with a handful of non-League nations like Germany, Turkey, and Bolshevik Russia.

The League was snubbed like the orphaned waif it had become.

Our press sneered at it; our politicians jeered at it; our Department of State at first refused to answer correspondence from it.

But as the 1920's wore on, we found that the League was important enough to warrant our dispatching "unofficial observers" to report on what was happening. By 1930 we had actually sent representatives to more than forty nonpolitical League conferences.

For a while it seemed as though we might sneak into the League through the back door. But in 1931, and again in 1935, the League was defied successively by Japan and Italy, and it then collapsed. During both of these crises we stood on the sidelines, assuming a partially co-operative attitude. But it was now too late. The time for co-operation was when the League was launched.

Would the League have been a success if we had joined it at the outset? We do not know. All that we can say with certainty is that the League was crippled at birth by the failure of the most powerful nation in the world to support it.

One other point must be stressed. The Treaty of Versailles,

of which the League was a part, was erected on the assumption that the United States would be one of the cornerstones. When the cornerstone was never put into place, the whole top-heavy structure tottered precariously for nearly two decades, and then crashed in ruin.

UNCLE SAM BECOMES UNCLE SHYLOCK

The ostrich-like isolationism of the postwar years seems all the harder to understand in the light of our changed economic position.

Before entering the war we had been a debtor nation, owing the various creditor nations some \$3,000,000,000. When the smoke of battle lifted, we were a creditor nation to the extent of about \$16,000,000,000.

Most of this money had been lent to our Associates in the war, principally Britain, France, and Italy. But they had not seen the cash involved; it had merely been advanced to them to buy military and other supplies in the United States. In any event, the loans were made as loans in good faith.

When the war ended, prosperous America wanted her money back—money that had been spent here in our own country, with handsome profits to those who had handled it. If the debtor nations did not pay what they owed us, our own taxpayers would have to reach down into their pockets and reimburse the Treasury.

But the semi-bankrupt European countries did not have the cash to pay off their debts. Besides, they had not really borrowed the money; they had merely borrowed supplies—goods. They were willing to send goods, of which they had surpluses; but they did not have the money.

We did not want goods. A flood of cheap foreign manufactures would close our own factories and drive our workingmen into bread lines. Fearful of such a prospect, we hastened to erect

the highest tariff wall in our history, in 1922, and we made it still higher, in 1930, with the Smoot-Hawley Act.

FORGIVE US OUR DEBTS

As time wore on, the European nations came to regard our loans as contributions to the common effort. We had entered the war without a large army, and while raising one, the least we could do was to sacrifice dollars while the Allies were sacrificing their sons. Surely blood was more precious than money.

But we did not look at it this way. A loan was a loan. And if the debtors defaulted, we would have to shoulder the burden ourselves. This would be unfair to the American taxpayer and weaken faith in international dealings. Besides, a considerable percentage of the money had been lent after the Armistice for reconstruction, and was not a war loan at all.

By various kinds of pressure we forced our debtors to sign agreements, under which they bound themselves over a period of years to remit annual installments, with interest. The interest rate was reduced in all cases, drastically so in some, but the principal remained the same.


The impoverished European nations planned to collect reparations from Germany to pay what they owed the United States. At the time of the peace negotiations, they had suggested that if we would forgive them their debts, they would forgive Germany a corresponding amount of reparations. In this way the recovery of Germany, and in turn of all Europe, would be hastened.

But our government, supported by the taxpayers, steadfastly and blindly declined to see any official connection between debts and reparations—although there certainly was one.

During the 1920's Germany was able to pay her reparations largely with money borrowed from American investors. Then came the Great Depression. Our private investors were pinched;

their loans to Germany dried up; German reparations payments dried up; and Allied debt payments to the United States dried up.

By 1934, all of the major European powers had defaulted on their payments to the United States. The debts were dead—probably forever.



PENNY WISE AND POUND FOOLISH

Our handling of the debts and reparations problems is a classic example of the dangers of ill-informed isolationism.

Though the world's creditor, we continued to act as though we were still the world's debtor. When a debtor nation, we had to send our goods abroad to pay off adverse balances. When a creditor nation, we declined to receive substantial quantities of other nations' goods, not realizing that we cannot sell unless we buy. We wanted to eat our cake and have it too.


As most of us see it now, the debts should have been written

off in 1919 as our subsidy to the Allies. This is what professional economists ultimately urged. But this is precisely what professional politicians either did not know or dared not tell the taxpayer.

In the end, all we ever collected was relatively little money and a vast amount of ill will, while impoverishing prospective customers and contributing heavily to the economic dislocation of the postwar world. In the long run, our short-sighted debt policy undoubtedly cost us much more than the face value of the uncollectible debts.

One of the major curses of the postwar years—and one that helped bring Hitler and the World War of 1939—was blind economic nationalism. And to this unhappy condition our tariff-debts-reparations policy made a substantial contribution.

14. The Disarmament Delusion



When the guns grew cold on Armistice Day, 1918, the United States found itself feverishly involved in the greatest naval race in history. Britain and Japan were also building, but they would not stop unless we did, and we would not stop unless they did.

We were now highly distrustful of the Japanese, who had vastly strengthened their position in the Pacific and the Far East by a mandate over the former German islands, and by acquiring German rights in China. Japan's course, both during and after the war, had aroused much fear as to her designs on China, and consequently on the Open Door.

The tension in the Pacific was so acute that the frantic naval race might easily have touched off a new world war.

American public opinion, alarmed by this senseless building rivalry, demanded action, and in 1921 President Harding invited the powers to a disarmament conference in Washington.

DISARMAMENT BY EXAMPLE

Secretary Hughes electrified the Conference by a sensational proposal that sixty-six great warships, built or building, be scrapped. When this was done the capital ship strength of the British, American, and Japanese navies was to be kept in the ratio of 5-5-3.

The Japanese were not pleased with the inferiority implied in the figure "3." But they finally accepted it when the British and the Americans agreed not to fortify certain advanced bases in the Pacific, including Guam, the Philippines, and the Aleutians. This meant that the Japanese navy, though smaller, would be dominant in Far Eastern waters.

The situation in the Pacific was further stabilized—so it seemed—by the Four-Power Pact, which was also negotiated at the Conference. Britain, France, Japan, and the United States all agreed to respect one another's rights in the Pacific, and to "communicate" with one another if their rights were threatened by an outside power.

This pact was in the nature of a foreign entanglement, in some ways more definitely so than the League of Nations. But the Republican majority was able to steer it past the Senate reefs, despite the loud outcries of the isolationist "bitter-enders."

The Washington Conference also produced the famous Nine Power Treaty, in which the signatories agreed to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China, and to uphold the principles of the Open Door. This was the first and only time in history that the powers got together, formulated a clear

definition of the Open Door, and agreed to be bound by it. Up to this time it had been only vaguely defined, and never officially accepted.

SECURITY PRECEDES DISARMAMENT

The great contribution of the Washington Conference was to clear away, temporarily, the poisonous atmosphere that hung over the unpacific Pacific.

But the net result, as far as China was concerned, was to give Japan a free hand in East Asia. The Conference had put her on her honor. If she chose to keep the Nine Power pledge, all might be well; if she did not, the Conference had left her so strong that she could work her will without serious threat of interference.

From the standpoint of disarmament, the Conference recorded two serious failures. First, it did nothing whatever to reduce land armament, primarily because of the opposition of France. And here the United States must shoulder some share of the blame.

At the Paris Peace Conference, France had demanded the left bank of the Rhine as a buffer against future German invasion. Wilson flatly opposed this scheme, because it would be a violation of self-determination to hand millions of unwilling Germans over to Frenchmen. After a bitter struggle, the French yielded, but only after Wilson and the British agreed to sign treaties promising to come to the armed assistance of France in the event of an unprovoked German invasion.

The Senate refused even to consider the treaty; it was an entangling military alliance of the first water. The British were then released from theirs. We next refused to join the League of Nations. The French were left with neither the Rhineland nor security. So they decided to maintain a great army, and to form alliances, in order to protect themselves. France's feeling of insecurity was the key to the failure of land disarmament during the postwar period.

The second great failure of the Conference related to naval disarmament. The quantitative limitations on competitive building applied *only* to large ships. Smaller craft, such as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, could be built without restriction. All attempts at disarmament in this direction were blocked by the security-obsessed French, who demanded unlimited numbers of auxiliary vessels, particularly submarines, to protect communications with their African colonies.

THE COLLAPSE OF A HOUSE OF CARDS

The Washington Conference provided only a breathing spell for the American taxpayer. Within a few years an ominous race in cruisers and other smaller craft was going full blast.

We did not join in the competition because we did not particularly need cruisers, because we felt secure, and because we were preoccupied with prosperity.

Still the race in smaller craft went merrily on, while we marked time. The London Conference of 1930 finally established upper limits in *all categories* of ships, and thus plugged the most serious loophole in naval disarmament. But to attain our upper limit we would have to lay out hundreds of millions of dollars. Other powers, notably Japan, built snugly up to their treaty quotas, while we lagged dangerously behind.

In 1931, the Japanese seized Manchuria, in violation of their solemn treaty obligations. Secretary Stimson sought British collaboration in halting Japan, but the British were not receptive to his advances.

During this crisis the Japanese learned that the League could be defied with safety. In 1934, they denounced the Washington Naval Treaty, which meant that in two years Japan would be free to build any kind of navy she desired.

In 1935, a final naval conference was held in London. The Japanese delegates walked out when they were denied parity—

and this was the inglorious end of the bright hopes of the Washington Conference.

Two years later, in 1937, the Japanese challenged the Open Door and the whole system of collective security in the Far East when they launched their undeclared war on China—a conflict which eventually merged with the World War of 1939.

SYMPTOMS AND DISEASES

In the year 1935 Chancellor Hitler announced a tremendous re-armament program for Germany. He justified his sensational move by pointing out that the former Allies had not disarmed, in accordance with their promises of 1918-1919.

Whatever Hitler's motives, this charge was true. Disarmament had not come, primarily because France felt insecure, and France felt insecure, in part, because the United States had not carried out Wilson's assurances in regard to the security treaty and the League of Nations.

We as a nation have long favored disarmament, because we have felt less need for armament than most other powers. Sheltered behind our ocean moats, and blessed with weak neighbors on both borders, we have failed to recognize that other nations may feel the need of heavy armaments because they feel insecure.

We are prone to look upon armaments as a disease, and say that if we abolish armaments we can abolish war. We fail to recognize that armaments are symptoms of a disease, and we must first remove the disease if we are to have lasting disarmament.

We have now learned—or should have learned—that disarmament by example can be overdone. Only co-operative disarmament can bring a measure of security.

15. The Mirage of Neutrality



The isolation of the late 1920's was tempered by a policy of hesitant co-operation with the rest of the world. We were slowly drifting toward the League, though through the back door; and it seemed possible that we might openly join within a few years.

Then came a series of events which halted all moves toward

international co-operation, and ushered in a period of intense isolationism.

The Great Depression caused the European nations to default on their debt payments, and we regarded this as further evidence of the folly of having dealings with "wicked foreigners."

The London Economic Conference collapsed in 1933—thanks in part to our refusal to co-operate—and thereafter all real attempts at international economic collaboration were abandoned. Henceforth every nation undertook to pull itself out of the depression by bootstrap methods—fostering home industry, manipulating currency, and erecting towering tariff walls.

In 1934 the Nye Senatorial Committee began to unearth some evidence as to the activities of bankers and international arms racketeers in the World War of 1914-1918. These findings were sensationally publicized, and the wholly unwarranted conclusion was drawn that the profiteers and munitioneers had been primarily responsible for dragging us into the conflict. We were now more than ever determined to draw apart from the "unclean" nations of the rest of the world.

LEGISLATING OURSELVES OUT OF WAR

In 1935 Mussolini took a page from Japan's book, defied the League of Nations, and overran Ethiopia. This was the death blow to the League, whose members were in a position to paralyze Italy, but who, like us, wanted to avoid a general outbreak at all costs.

Fearful that the crisis would develop into another World War, Congress hastily drafted and hastily enacted the so-called Neutrality Act of 1935. Henceforth American citizens could travel on belligerent merchantmen only at their own risk. Henceforth American arms and munitions could not be lawfully sold or transported to the warring nations.

The Roosevelt administration did not favor such straitjacket legislation. It much preferred a law which would enable it to withhold munitions from the aggressor, and sell them to the aggressor's victim. In this way the influence of the most powerful democracy would be thrown on the side of law, order, and international decency.

But American public opinion was unwilling to vest such vast power in the President. He might plunge the country into war; and our conviction that almost anything was better than war had been strengthened by the sensational Nye revelations. We would stand on the side lines with folded arms while the aggressors strangled the democracies one by one.

In 1937, Congress enacted previous experience into a "permanent" neutrality law. Henceforth it was *unlawful* for an American citizen to travel on a belligerent ship; he could not even sail at his own risk. He could not sell or transport munitions to the belligerents, but for two years he might sell the raw materials of war, provided the purchaser paid cash and took them away himself ("cash-and-carry").

The neutrality legislation of the 1930's was a striking abandonment of our historic position on freedom of the seas. It was the measure of our determination to stay out of war at all costs.

UNNEUTRAL NEUTRALITY

In the autumn of 1939 Hitler's panzer divisions burst into Poland, and the long-threatened conflict was on.

We as a people were almost unanimous in desiring to stay out of the fray, but we were also almost unanimous in hoping that the unprepared democracies would win. We wanted to sell them the arms they so desperately needed, but our hands were tied by our neutrality legislation.

Congress responded to these views when, after a stormy debate, it passed the Neutrality Act of 1939. The embargo on arms was lifted, and henceforth the belligerents who controlled the seas (the democracies) could buy munitions from us, though on a cash-and-carry basis. The isolationists fought this change with great bitterness, but they were somewhat mollified by the provision which thereafter forbade American ships to venture into the danger zones.

DISHONOR BECOMES HONOR

The Act of 1939 was in some ways the most significant of the various neutrality laws. We did not abdicate our rights; on the contrary, we specifically reserved them. Yet American citizens were forbidden to travel on belligerent vessels, or to sail their ships into the danger areas.

This is precisely what Wilson had refused to allow in 1917 because, he said, it would be dishonorable. If the Act of 1939 had existed in 1917, we probably would not have gone to war with Germany, at least not when we did.

The Act of 1939 was designed for a conflict like that of 1917. For what it attempted to do, it was remarkably successful. Prior to May 1941, no American ship was deliberately sunk by the

Germans, for no American ship could lawfully venture into the danger zones.

If we had wanted to stay out of the World War of 1939 at all costs, the Neutrality Act might well have kept us out, until, perhaps, the Axis had finished off the other democracies and was prepared to attack us.

NEUTRALITY YIELDS TO SELF-INTEREST

When the World War of 1939 began, we confidently assumed that the Allies would win. Entrenched behind their Maginot Line, and strangling Germany with their blockade, they would in time force Hitler to his knees.

But Hitler suddenly outflanked the Maginot line, knocked France out of the war, and halted on the shores of the English channel, only twenty miles away from Britain—Europe's last bastion of democracy.

The American people were confronted with perhaps the most momentous decision in their history. If Britain went down, the United States would stand as the world's last great democracy, faced with formidable odds. Would it not be better to aid Britain, even in violation of the rules of neutrality, rather than have to fight alone?

We consulted our self-interest, and did what seemed to be the sensible thing. Hitler and Mussolini had already proclaimed undying warfare against the "stinking corpse" of democracy, and had thrown international law and neutral rights out the window. So we in turn threw neutral obligations out the window, and rendered Britain unneutral aid in her darkest hour, including the transfer of fifty overage destroyers from our Navy.

But haphazard assistance to Britain was not enough. She was rapidly nearing the end of her financial tether. In March 1941 Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, under which we pledged unlimited aid to those nations resisting aggression.

This, in effect, was an unofficial declaration of war on the Axis, or rather a belated recognition of the fact that the dictators had unofficially declared war on us. We still did not want to fight; but we were willing to face the risk of war rather than let England go under.

THE WAR FOR OUR WAY OF LIFE

The Axis nations—Germany, Italy, and Japan—had no alternative but to accept our challenge. Up to this time Germany had studiously avoided sinking our ships, because she did not want to force us into the war. But now we were making economic war on the Axis, through lend-lease in Europe, and economic strangulation in the Far East, where we were attempting to halt Japan's aggressive push toward the East Indies by embargo measures.

The inevitable German attacks on our ships, both merchantmen and destroyers, now started. In retaliation, Congress repealed certain restrictions of the Neutrality Act of 1939, and thereafter American ships could sail into the danger zones. We had finally come the full circle back to freedom of the seas.

Though we were actually at war with the Axis combination, the strong isolationist bloc held us back from an official declaration. On December 7, 1941, "a day that will live in infamy," the Japanese, seeking to break through our ring of economic restrictions in the Far East, launched a devastating attack on Pearl Harbor and other outposts. Official declarations of war rapidly followed on all sides, and America entered another world conflict.

Basically, we were not fighting for freedom of the seas, or because we loved England, but because we believed that American democracy—the American way of life—could not exist in a world dominated by dictators.

16. The Triumph of Pan-Americanism



Before the meteoric rise of Hitler, we had not always been the good neighbor. We were incomparably stronger than all of the other nations of this hemisphere combined; and we sometimes showed the ignorance, indifference, and even the contempt of the strong for the weak. We all too frequently used a heavy hand to bring about a

settlement of disputes to our advantage.

OUR LADY OF THE SNOWS

Toward thinly-populated Canada we have often been a bad neighbor. In 1775, and again in 1812, we invaded her, with intent to remain, but were repulsed both times. In 1837, we rendered open assistance to her rebels. And we assumed a blustering attitude on the Maine, Oregon, and later, the Alaska boundary disputes.

The one outstandingly bright spot in our relations with Canada before 1860 was the conclusion of a reciprocity treaty in 1854, under which each country would admit certain goods from the other free of duty.

But Britain's friendliness toward the South during the Civil War caused us to vent our anger against Canada. We somewhat spitefully abrogated the reciprocity agreement in 1866; we allowed armed mobs of Irishmen to invade Canada from our soil; we talked loudly of annexing all Canada.

Relations improved as the century neared its end, and the annexation agitation died down. In 1911, we went so far as to

offer a new reciprocity agreement to Canada; but when our politicians tactlessly proclaimed that this was but the entering wedge for outright annexation, the Canadians indignantly rejected the proposal. Despite this setback, relations continued generally friendly, as befitted neighbors who counted each other as among their best customers.

The menace of Hitler further tightened the bonds of amity. In 1938, President Roosevelt, speaking at Kingston, Ontario, gave a solemn pledge that we would not stand "idly by" if Canada were threatened by an outside power. This was generally applauded in Canada as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to her. In other ways, the two neighbors were drawn together in a closeness and cordiality that had not seemed possible at any time during the preceding century.

THE COLOSSUS OF THE NORTH

One of our most common illusions is that the people of Latin America have long loved us and our Monroe Doctrine.

It is true that intelligent Latin Americans have never had any violent objection to the Monroe Doctrine in its original form. Why should they complain if we chose to incur the expense of protecting them while protecting ourselves?

But our conduct in the 1840's and 1850's began to arouse distrust, and then fear. We annexed Texas after assisting her in her revolution against Mexico; we went to war with Mexico and took almost one-half of her domain; and we tried repeatedly to secure Cuba.

These unhappy incidents unfortunately did much to erase the friendly feeling resulting from our sympathy and help during the period of the Latin American wars of independence.

After the Civil War, our good intentions, especially those of Secretary Blaine, were often misunderstood by our suspicious southern neighbors. Our shadow grew longer and darker when

we wrested Puerto Rico from Spain in 1898, and made a sort of protectorate of Cuba by means of the Platt Amendment.

Theodore Roosevelt's Big Stick policy excited even greater apprehension. In 1903 he acquired the Canal Zone in unseemly haste from two-weeks-old Panama; in 1904 he enunciated the interventionist Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

Nor did the situation improve under Roosevelt's immediate successors. Relations with Mexico became critical following the revolution of 1911, which gravely menaced American lives and property. President Wilson tried to stop disorder by refusing to recognize the ruthless President Huerta; and American troops effected a bloody occupation of Vera Cruz in 1914. Had it not been for the mediation offered by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, it is difficult to see how full-dress hostilities could have been avoided.

FROM BAD NEIGHBOR TO BIG BROTHER

The dawn of a new day was heralded when, late in 1927, President Coolidge sent the tactful and highly successful Ambassador Morrow to Mexico. President Hoover continued the good work by withdrawing the marines from Nicaragua, and by adopting a noninterventionist interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.

The full flowering of the Good Neighbor Policy came with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Great Depression had caused the people of the United States to lose interest in Latin American investment and intervention, and the Administration believed that in the long run it was sound policy to deal more justly with our southern neighbors.

Accordingly, Roosevelt withdrew the marines from Haiti; terminated the hated Platt Amendment; negotiated a more equitable treaty with Panama; and ended the protracted Dominican customs receivership. Secretary Hull negotiated a sheaf of reciprocal trade agreements which facilitated commerce with Latin

America. But most significant of all, the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt openly and unreservedly renounced the practice of intervening under the Theodore Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY

The Bad Neighbor policy of Adolf Hitler, combined with the Good Neighbor policy of Franklin Roosevelt, wrought a Pan American miracle.

At the Lima Conference, in 1938, the American republics agreed upon an unprecedented declaration of solidarity. At the Havana Conference of American Foreign Ministers (1940), following the collapse of France, it was agreed that the American republics might *jointly* occupy and temporarily administer any European-owned areas in this hemisphere that were in danger of falling into the hands of the dictator nations.

This was of epochal significance. Hitherto we had insisted on being the sole guardians and interpreters of the Monroe Doctrine. Henceforth it was to be shared and supported by every one of the twenty-one republics of the Americas. At long last the hitherto hated doctrine of Monroe had been "continentalized."

The assault on Pearl Harbor was an assault on the Americas. Within six weeks, all but two of the Latin American republics had declared war on the Axis or had severed relations with it. And both of these two neutral nations promptly proffered unneutral assistance to the United States.

Whether Roosevelt had planned it that way or not, the Good Neighbor policy was paying enormous dividends in hemispheric defense.

17. The Unfolding of Foreign Policy



It has long been a common sneer that the foreign policy of the United States is to have no foreign policy.

This is simply not true. We might well challenge any other nation to produce a list of major foreign policies more clearly defined or more persistently followed over a period of years.

There have, of course, been deviations and inconsistencies. But many of these have arisen because we have had different policies for different regions.

In Europe, our traditional policy has been abstention from political and military entanglements.

In Latin America, and particularly in the region of the Canal danger zone, our policy until recent times has been intervention to protect our lifeline.

In the Far East, where we have never had the strength to act alone, our general policy has been to co-operate with the other powers in upholding the Open Door.

ISOLATIONIST ILLUSIONS

Isolation is the oldest and most persistent of all our foreign policies. As outlined by Washington and the other Founding Fathers, it meant that we would not deliberately entangle ourselves in the political broils of Europe, except to make "temporary" connections for "extraordinary" emergencies.

This policy was looked upon as a temporary device, to be used while the United States grew stronger. We were simply too weak to risk an active role in international affairs.

In later years the original policy of isolation has been distorted to mean that we *are* isolated from the affairs of Europe, and that what happens there is no real concern of ours.

The original isolationist was an abstentionist. While recognizing that Europe's affairs were often of vital concern to us, he believed that it was ordinarily sound policy to steer clear of foreign political broils, particularly while we were weak.

The latter-day isolationist is frequently an insulationist. He believes that we can insulate ourselves from the rest of the world.

The record belies his position. Nine general wars, and nine American involvements. We could not stay out when we were small and weak; we could not stay out when we were great and powerful. It will be even more difficult to stay out in the future, now that modern mechanical miracles have shrunk the oceans and made the rest of the world our next door neighbor.

The only sure way to keep out of another world war is to prevent it from breaking out. Elemental common sense points to the desirability of active co-operation with the other nations of the world in establishing machinery for maintaining peace.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE COMES OF AGE

If isolation meant that we would ordinarily stay out of the affairs of Europe, the Monroe Doctrine meant that Europe must stay out of the affairs of the Americas.

For more than a century we cherished the Doctrine as a unilateral policy. It was ours; we had thought it up; we would apply it when, where, and how we wanted. And we did.

None of our policies ever made more enemies, especially the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, under which we sent troops into a number of the weaker Caribbean republics.

Then came a great change. In the 1930's we renounced the interventionist Roosevelt Corollary. In 1940 we admitted all the

Latin American republics to a share in the application and enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine.

Today the Monroe Doctrine is stronger than ever before. It is recognized, supported, and shared by the neighbors who so recently condemned it. Twenty-one republics now stand behind it, where only one stood before.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

We have always been a seafaring people, and we have long contended for freedom of the seas: the right to do business in wartime without intolerable or unlawful restrictions at the hands of the belligerents.

From 1798 to 1917 this principle was a primary cause of two of our declared wars and two of our undeclared wars.

In the days of the sailing ship and conflicts of limited scope, we could maintain freedom of the seas with some success, especially if we had sufficient power to command respect for our position.

But our experience with the submarine in 1917 proved to us that, in a world war, the blockaded belligerent will deliberately sink our ships if he must do so in order to win.

In a situation of this kind, the only way to avoid involvement is to keep out of the way. The neutrality legislation of the 1930's recognized this fact, and voluntarily renounced the ancient principle of freedom of the seas.

In 1941, after we had virtually gone to war with Germany, we returned to the old policy. But in this age of total war, with the submarine and the bomber at large, freedom of the seas as we first knew it is fighting a losing battle.

THE FRUITION OF PAN-AMERICANISM

For more than a century, Pan-Americanism has aimed at the closer association of the American republics for the achievement

of common aspirations—commercial, political, and cultural. We have long favored Pan-Americanism as a means of decreasing European influence in the New World, and further strengthening the Monroe Doctrine.

The ideal was slow to take root because of numerous barriers, including race, language, religion, competing economies, and European cultural and commercial ties. Above all, the aggressive and somewhat domineering attitude of the Colossus of the North greatly hindered effective co-operation.

Within the last decade, Pan-Americanism has achieved undreamed-of success. The Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt, together with the Axis threat to this hemisphere, has drawn the twenty-one republics of the Americas into closer bonds of unity than had ever seemed possible.

UNHINGING THE OPEN DOOR

The Open Door means the right of American citizens to compete with other foreigners on equal terms in certain economically backward countries, notably China. It is the newest of our major policies, and the only one that did not spring directly from our vital interests in this hemisphere.

On the whole, the Open Door has not been successful. Reluctantly accepted by the Powers, and not clearly defined until 1922, it has had an uncertain career. The American people have been rather indifferent to it, because our trade with China has never been more than two or three per cent of our total foreign trade, and our investments even less. We have been unable to give the Open Door effective backing, because the Far East is far away, and because it would be immensely costly to maintain a force sufficiently strong to resist the great Far Eastern Powers.

In the 1930's Japan moved into China, and began closing the Door on the fingers of our merchants. The Open Door failed for two reasons. First, Japan regarded her material and strategic

interests in China as vital; we regarded ours as relatively minor. Second, Japan was willing to fight for what she conceived to be her interests, and did; and she had the physical force to make good her challenge. We were not willing to fight for interests that were only secondary, and we did not have the physical force to support our position even if we had been willing to fight. So the Open Door was slammed shut—at least temporarily.

ODDS AND ENDS

The United States has long advocated the peaceful settlement of disputes. Although we have become involved in several wars, and have seen fit on occasion to decline arbitration, we have nevertheless been a pioneer and leader in urging disarmament and arbitration.

Certain other policies we have pursued for only limited periods or for specific purposes.

During the Nineteenth Century territorial expansion was a major policy, and was not abandoned until we had filled out our present continental limits.

Imperialism is the name commonly applied to our expansionist policy at the end of the century, when we gathered in the Philippines and certain other outposts. But this was only a temporary policy, stumbled into somewhat accidentally; and in 1934 we made arrangements to hand the Philippines back to their people. At worst, the imperialism of these years was not so grasping or so extensive as that of the great European Powers.

Expatriation, or the right to naturalize foreigners, was a principle for which we long contended, and to which we belatedly secured the consent of other nations.

Until the Twentieth Century, we generally recognized new foreign governments as soon as they were established in power. Woodrow Wilson tried, without conspicuous success, to bring order to Latin America by withholding recognition from bloody-

handed dictators. At the time of Japan's rape of Manchuria we sought to discourage aggression by refusing to recognize territorial changes brought about by force (the Hoover-Stimson doctrine). But in general our policy has been to recognize whatever regime is actually in control.

Dollar Diplomacy—also called economic imperialism—was pursued for about twenty years in the Far East and Latin America, with only indifferent success, and then dropped.

The reciprocal lowering of tariff barriers by special treaty is a policy that we have pursued from time to time, beginning with the Canadian agreement of 1854. In recent years Secretary Hull has negotiated more than twenty such pacts under the Trade Agreements Act.

A great many routine problems in American diplomacy—perhaps most of them—are necessarily solved without reference to fundamental policy, but on an opportunistic, rule-of-thumb, day-to-day basis.

18. Basic Principles



Certain guiding principles may be derived from a study of American foreign affairs:

1. *International relations are infinitely complicated.*

Where only two powers are involved, a diplomatic problem may be extremely complex. Where more are involved, the difficulties are usually multiplied manyfold.

From 1940 to 1942 the Department of State was bitterly criticized for not breaking with Vichy France. It later appeared that

the maintenance of these delicate relations paved the way for our lightning invasion of North Africa. Naturally, Washington could not silence its critics by revealing its ultimate purposes.

As a rule, the individual citizen should temper his criticism of those who conduct our foreign affairs. In international dealings, all is not black and white; and more is always involved than meets the eye.

2. *Domestic problems often have international aspects.*

With the world shrinking daily, domestic affairs tend more and more to merge with international affairs. What may seem to be a purely domestic problem, such as a tariff, currency control, silver purchase, or immigration often has wide-reaching effects. This explains many things otherwise puzzling in the behavior of nations toward one another.

The Immigration Act of 1924 was dictated primarily by domestic and political considerations. Yet by abruptly terminating the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908, and by bluntly refusing to permit some two hundred Japanese a year to come in on a quota basis, we grievously offended a sensitive and powerful people. Millions of Japanese vowed never to forget such an act of discrimination. And this bitterness had a very definite bearing on the state of mind that produced the assault on Pearl Harbor.

In dealing with such matters we must learn to weigh short-run against long-run gains or losses. In 1924 we paid much too high a price in Japanese ill will for the hollow satisfaction of barring a handful of coolies.

3. *Self-interest is the basis of all foreign policies.*

The foreign policies of all nations, including the United States, are bottomed squarely on self-interest, or on what is thought to be self-interest. Individual countries must look out for themselves, because if they do not, no one else will.

Nations do not ordinarily confer substantial favors on other nations out of pure friendship. Usually, as was the case with the

French Alliance in 1778, they expect something in return, whether in actual assistance or good will. It is always wise to look for the motive when other nations come to us bringing gifts.

This does not mean that self-interest must be pure selfishness. There is such a thing in international relations as enlightened self-interest which looks far into the future and which is the mark of real statesmanship.

Both the United States and other nations have acted generously in international affairs without any thought of immediate profit. In 1883 we returned a substantial indemnity to Japan, and in 1908 to China. As a consequence, we doubtless gained a great deal more in good will and actual trade than the original sums represented.

The acid test of any foreign policy is whether or not *in the long run* it will operate more to our advantage than to our disadvantage. Should we pursue a policy of isolation which shuns present-day responsibilities but which seems certain to involve the nation in ultimate catastrophe? Or should we pursue a policy of co-operation which involves temporary sacrifice but which gives promise of long range security? To serve ourselves effectively we may also have to serve others.

4. *Physical force is the final determinant in diplomacy.*

If the policy of one nation clashes with that of another, the policy backed by the greater physical force, other things being equal, will prevail.

Theodore Roosevelt once said, "I never take a step in foreign policy unless I am assured that I shall be able eventually to carry out my will by force."

Our Far Eastern policy collapsed in 1941 because we took position against Japan which we were not able to back up by force. Among other things, we had foolishly allowed our Navy to fall too far behind in the armaments race of the 1930's, and

we had failed to strengthen advanced bases in the Pacific after Japan's denunciation of the Washington Treaty.

In short, we should first determine what our policy is going to be, and then build up an armed force to support it.

5. Power imposes responsibilities.

When we were weak, we had no choice but to pursue an isolationist policy. Today our power is so great that it will be felt throughout the world, no matter what course we take. We owe it to others, as well as to ourselves, to employ that power actively and intelligently.

Unless we help in working out an effective method for preserving world peace, another world war will almost certainly come, and we shall as certainly be involved.

6. Policies are means to ends.

Policies are made for nations, not nations for policies. If genuine self-interest clashes with policy, the policy should be set aside.

We are reluctant to shake off the dead hand of tradition, particularly if it is hallowed by association with the names of Washington and Jefferson. But the Founding Fathers were great because they were willing to break with the past, and overthrow the centuries-old British rule.

In diplomacy, rigidity is death; flexibility is life. Washington and his colleagues advocated no straitjacket policy. As intelligent men, they would have been the first to say that when the conditions which call a policy into being cease to exist, and the policy ceases to be advantageous, it should be abandoned. Even Jefferson, during the Louisiana crisis, was willing to make an entangling alliance, which he distrusted, with the British, whom he disliked, in order to safeguard our vital interests.

Since that time we have changed, and so has the rest of the world. We must seek to understand these new conditions, and base our policy upon the realities of a world that exists and not

upon the agreeable memory of a world that will never return.

7. *Self-righteousness hinders international dealings.*

If international disputes are to be peacefully settled, all nations must learn to view their diplomatic problems through the other nation's eyes, as well as through their own.

We are prone to look upon ourselves as better than other countries—less greedy, less imperialistic, less warlike.

Our record has its good spots and its bad spots, like the record of other Powers. If we have behaved better than others, possibly that has been largely because we have not suffered from overpopulation, or from other pressures that turn nations into aggressors.

But America has no mission to impose democracy on the rest of the world.

We began as the first large-scale democracy in history, and the hostility of the monarchical world caused us to adopt an aggressive attitude that colored our entire national life. We have consistently applauded the fall of autocracy and the rise of democracy—in some cases to the extent of giving outright assistance.

We like our form of government, and take justifiable pride in it. But we can gain nothing but ill will by trying to thrust it on others. There are millions of ignorant, illiterate, and inert people all over the world who have shown no desire to go to the trouble of ruling themselves, and are apparently content to let their rulers do it for them. They know little about our kind of democracy, and unless they understand its implications and want it themselves, they would not know what to do with it if they got it.

8. *Diplomacy requires the services of our ablest men.*

A field as complicated and strewn with dynamite as diplomacy has no place for the meddler, the bungler, or the broken-down politician.

Over the years, our foreign service was so ill-paid, ill-housed, and ill-trained as to be little less than a national disgrace. Such conditions have been greatly improved in recent years, but we—the richest of all nations—still do not pay our most important ambassadors enough to enable them to live on their salaries. The result is that in our vaunted democracy only wealthy men can afford to take these positions, and all too often the appointee is a politician who has bought his office with a generous campaign contribution.

We willingly pay about \$100,000,000 for a battleship. The entire diplomatic service in normal times costs about \$10,000,000 a year. The addition of a relatively small sum would enable us to appoint the ablest men to the highest diplomatic posts. This, indeed, would be the cheapest possible kind of insurance, for high-class diplomats can and do prevent the outbreak of costly wars.

We must also elect able and far-visioned men to Congress, and above all to the Senate, which exercises a veto power over treaties. The ignorance, intolerance and partisanship of a handful of Senators can work, and has worked, incalculable harm.

9. Public opinion controls our fundamental foreign policies.

This is a democracy, and the people are the authors of their foreign policies. Indeed, each basic policy has arisen in response to a national need or a popular demand.

The government in Washington enjoys a certain freedom in the conduct of diplomacy, but it dare not depart too far from the wishes of the people in matters of fundamental importance. If it did, it would be turned out of office at the next election.

Since, in the long run, the people usually get what they want, it follows that if we are to improve our foreign policy, we must improve the understanding of the average citizen. Narrowness, intolerance, bigotry, and demagoguery fatten on ignorance.

We must reduce our shameful illiteracy rate. We must stress

the study of history, foreign affairs, international relations and comparative government. We must stimulate travel and the learning of foreign languages. We must encourage the presentation of sound and impartial information through the newspapers, the radio, magazines, public forums and other agencies.

Upon every citizen in our democracy rests a solemn obligation to inform himself so that he may shape his foreign policy along constructive and far-sighted lines.

SUGGESTED READINGS

- Bailey, Thomas A. *A Diplomatic History of the American People*. Second Ed. New York. F. S. Crofts. 1942. A chronological treatment, stressing public opinion. The author has abridged some of this material for the present Headline Book.
- Buell, Raymond L. *Isolated Amerca*. New York. Knopf. 1940. Critical of our isolationist policy, this book is still useful, though somewhat outmoded by events of recent years.
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- Griswold, A. Whitney. *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*. New York. Harcourt Brace. 1938. The best general treatment of the period since 1898.
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- Perkins, Dexter. *Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine*. Boston. Little, Brown. 1941. A brilliantly written analysis by the leading authority on the subject.
- Simonds, Frank H. *American Foreign Policy in the Post-War Years*. Baltimore. Johns Hopkins Press. 1935. Provocative analysis by able journalist with isolationist leanings.
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- Stuart, Graham H. *Latin America and the United States*. 3rd Ed. New York. Century. 1938. Best account of relations from early times to present.
- Williams, Benjamin H. *American Diplomacy: Policies and Practice*. New York. McGraw-Hill. 1936. A scholarly treatment of individual policies; topical rather than chronological.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Thomas A. Bailey is a professor of history in Stanford University, and the author of *Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises* (1934); *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (1940; 2nd ed. 1942); *The Policy of the United States toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918* (1942); and many articles on diplomatic history in *The American Historical Review*, *The Journal of Modern History*, and other professional journals. He was Albert Shaw lecturer on diplomatic history in the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, The Johns Hopkins University, 1941.

